Working time: Research and development 1995 - 1997 by unknown
Lt') 
CX)  -- > 
w  w 
u 
***  *  * 
*  *  *  - * 
* * * /)  '/ .lj  i1 !  v! /  .I  . 
/f: 
:  .... >  ~~'  ',.; 
····~·-'  --./  ):) ..  r 
Working time: 
Research and development 
1995- 1997 
A review of literature (1995- 1997) commissioned 
by the European Commission and  the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions 
Employment & social affairs 
Industrial relations and industrial change 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations 
and Social Affairs 
Directorate V/D.2 
Manuscript completed in June 1998. The contents of  this publication do not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of 
the European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations 
and Social Affairs. 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int). 
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998 
ISBN 92-828-5591-0 
© European Communities, 1998 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Printed in Belgium 
PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER Executive Summary  ....•.......................•...........•.•..............••..•................•....•.....•.............................................. 5 
1.  Introduction··································································~······································································ 11 
2.  Objectives and presentation of the study ........•..........................•..•...................••................................ 15 
3.  Reduced working time and employment: the macro-economic approach •.......•................................ 19 
3.1  Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 19 
3. 2  Macro-economic simulations ............................................................................................................ 20 
3 .2.1  Federal Planning Bureau: The macro-economic consequences of  policies to reduce working 
time ......................................................................................................................................... 20 
3. 2  .1.1  Discussion of results ............................................................................................................ 22 
3.2.2  Aries, S. Holland [8]  :The macro-economic consequences of a reduction/re-organisation of 
working time ........................................................................................................................... 25 
3.2.2.1  Discussion ofresults  ............................................................................................................ 27 
3.3  Comments ......................................................................................................................................... '].9 
4.  Reductions of working time and employment: an approach based on micro-economics and 
monographs  .................•.•.•.•..............•.•...•................................•..................................................................... 39 
4. 1  Reductions of  working time and  job sharing: paving the way for job creation ................................... 3  9 
4.1.1  Factors promoting job sharing ................................................................................................. 41 
4.1.2  Trigger factors and impact on employment: what can be learnt from enterprise monographs ... 42 
4.1.3  Reduction of  working time, overtime and adjustment of  employment. ...................................... 45 
4.1.4  Income distribution, wage compensation and the effects of a reduction of  working time on 
employment. .......................................................................................................................................... 4  7 
4.1.5  Flexible working time: the European experience ...................................................................... 48 
4.1.6  Comments ............................................................................................................................... 50 
4. 2  Policies to reduce wage costs dnd reduce working time .................................................................... 53 
4.2.1  Fixed labour costs and reductions ofworking time ................................................................... 53 
4.2.2  Impact of  compulsory levies on the distribution of  working time .............................................. 54 
4.2.3  The impact of a modification of the rates and structure of compulsory levies on working time 
and employment .................................................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.4.  Financial incentives to reduce working time and job sharing  .................................................... 57 
4.2.5  Comments ............................................................................................................................... 59 
References  ..................................................•....•...•..•...................................................................................... 63 
Annex .....................................................•.........................................••.•......................................................... 65 
3 Corrigenda Corrigenda 
Executive Summary 
The first two paragraphs should be read as follows: 
"Executive Summary 
This report is  intended to pinpoint the main lessons that can be drawn 
from experiments to adapt or reduce working time through an analysis of 
a  set  of studies  on  working  time  commissioned  by  the  European 
Commission and the European Foundation in Dublin between 1995 and 
1997. These studies cover a very wide range of topics, making it very 
difficult to provide a summary.  The fact  that there was so much non-
comparable material made  it necessary for  us  to  select documents  for 
analysis and to focus our attention chiefly on the employment dimension 
of  the problems raised by working time. 
Part I of  the report analyses the impact of  a general reduction of  working 
time  on  employment  through  a  critical  review  of macro-economic 
simulations conducted on behalf of the Commission. These simulations 
show  that  a  macro-economic  approach  has  both  strengths  and 
weaknesses.  Among  these  strengths,  the  possibility  of  modelling 
separate sets of scenarios makes it possible to assess the  sensitivity of 
results  to  the  hypotheses  adopted.  These  macro-economic  simulations 
highlight, in particular, the importance of  the methods by which working 
time  policies  are  implemented  (in  particular  levels  of  wage 
compensation  and  the  impact  of reduced  working  time  on  capital 
operating time) and their consequences on the efficiency of policies to 
reduce  working  time  from  the  point  of view  of employment  and 
economic growth. However, the lack of information on the micro-economic foundations of 
the adjustment mechanisms at play and the rudimentary nature or even 
lack  of specific  empirical  evidence  on,  for  instance,  the  impact  of 
working time reduction on labour supply, the wage bargaining system, 
enterprise recruitment strategies, etc., obviously represents a weakness. 
The level to which the models are aggregated seems greatly to simplify 
the micro-economic behaviour of economic actors (enterprises, workers, 
social  partners):  these  models  take  only  very  insufficient  account  of 
certain  adjustment  mechanisms  that  could  substantially  diminish  the 
positive effects expected from job sharing policies. In general, analysis 
of the  macro-economic  consequences  of a reduction of working  time 
makes it necessary to  formulate hypotheses exogenous to the model in 
relation  to  basic  variables  such  as  levels  of  wage  compensation, 
productivity gains achieved and capital operating time. In this context, a 
critical analysis of the validity of the hypotheses adopted would tend to 
show  that  fmdings  in  terms  of employment  and  unemployment  are 
undoubtedly over-estimated." 
Point 4.1.4: 
The first sentence of  the last paragraph should read as follows: 
"It is  also  interesting to  note that most of the collective reductions of 
working time over the  last ten years have taken place in  Germany and 
the Netherlands where the average  income level is  relatively high and 
the dispersion of  income distribution is relatively low." CE-18-98-776-E N-K Executive Summary 
This  report is  intended to pinpoint the main  lessons that can be  drawn from  experiments to 
adapt  or reduce  working  time  through  an  analysis  of a  set  of studies  on  working  time 
commissioned by the European Commission and the European Foundation in Dublin between 
1995  and  1997.  These studies cover a very wide range of topics,  making it very difficult to 
provide a summary. The fact that the material was so rich and diverse made it necessary for us 
to  select  documents  for  analysis  and  to  focus  our  attention  chiefly  on  the  employment 
dimension of  the problems raised by working time. 
Part I of  the report analyses the impact of a general reduction of working time on employment 
through  a  critical  review  of  macro-economic  simulations  conducted  on  behalf  of the 
Commission. These simulations show that a macro-economic approach has both strengths and 
weaknesses.  Among  these  strengths,  the possibility  of modelling  separate  sets  of scenarios 
makes it possible to assess whether results are in keeping with the hypotheses adopted.  These 
macro-economic simulations highlight,  in particular, the importance of the methods by which 
working time  policies  are  implemented  (in  particular  levels  of wage  compensation  and  the 
impact  of reduced  working  time  on  equipment  use  times)  and  their  consequences  on  the 
efficiency  of policies  to  reduce  working  time  from  the  point  of view  of employment  and 
economic growth. However, the lack of  information on the micro-economic foundations of  the 
adaptation  mechanisms  implemented  and  the  rudimentary  nature  or  even  lack  of specific 
reports reflecting, for instance, labour supply practices, national methods of employee training, 
enterprise recruitment strategies, etc., obviously represents a weakness. The level to which the 
models  are aggregated seems greatly to  simplify  the  micro-economic  practices of economic 
operators  (enterprises,  workers,  social  partners)~ these  models  take  only  very  insufficient 
account of certain adaptation mechanisms that could substantially diminish the positive effects 
expected from job sharing policies.  In general,  analysis of the macro-economic consequences 
of a reduction  of working time  makes  it  necessary to formulate  hypotheses  external to the 
model in  relation to basic variables such as  levels of wage compensation,  productivity gains 
achieved  and  equipment use times.  In  this  context,  a  critical  analysis  of the  validity  of the 
hypotheses  adopted  would  tend  to  show  that  findings  in  terms  of  employment  and 
unemployment are undoubtedly over-estimated. 
In the case ofthe micro-economic approach (Part II of  the report), the traditional optimisation 
models show that a reduction of working time  may,  under certain conditions,  have  positive 
effects on employment. Impact on the volume of  workers depends on four types of  factor:  the 
extent of adaptation costs and the degree of homogeneity of the labour force, the possibilities 
for substitution between men and working time and between capital and labour, the impact of a 
5 reduction of working time on equipment use times  and  lastly levels  of wage compensation. 
These  studies  rightly  show,  however,  that while  favourable  effects  on  employment  may  be 
positive in theory, the job sharing effect is based on very restrictive conditions which are very 
unlikely to be satisfied at sectoral or macro-economic level. 
The  micro-economic  and  monographic  approach  is  obviously  of interest  since  it  makes  it 
possible to identify a certain number of circumstantial factors that shape the job sharing effect 
of a reduction of working time.  These  studies  confirm,  in  particular,  the importance of the 
methods  by  which  a  reduction  of working  time  is  implemented  and  the  importance  of 
negotiation processes and the behaviour of  economic operators. The micro-economic approach 
highlights,  moreover, the important part that processes to reorganise production methods and 
to adapt working hours play in the impact of a reduction of  working time on employment. The 
authors of  the various reports put forward,  on the bases of case studies, convincing arguments 
about the  conditions  that are needed  for  a policy to  reduce/adapt  working time  to  have  a 
positive  effect  on employment  and  on the  competitiveness of enterprises.  While  these  field 
studies  would  seem  to  point  to  positive  effects  on  employment  and  competitiveness  at 
enterprise level,  it  is  questionable whether these favourable  cases can be transferred to and· 
reproduced  in  other enterprises,  sectors or even  other Member  States  (especially  when the 
institutional set-up in these Member States means that negotiated compromises are harder to 
obtain).  The  fact  that  the  enterprise  samples  selected  are  not  very  representative  should 
encourage  readers  not  to  be  tempted  to  generalise  the  sometimes  beneficial  effects  of a 
reduction of  working time on employment to the economy as a whole. 
The various  studies analysed  in  this  report also  confirm that,  in  order to have  a favourable 
effect on employment, a reduction of  working time must be part and parcel of a wider context 
including production and work organisation. Modifications of  working time seem to be one of 
a  number  of factors  in  an  overall  process  to  restructure  production  methods  and  work 
organisation.  The  transition  from  Taylorist  methods  of work  organisation  and  production 
management  to  post-Fordist methods  paves the way for  the introduction  of innovative  and 
diversified systems for managing working time. It should be noted, however, that an adaptation 
or modulation of  working hours is not enough on its own to reduce working time. While some 
modifications of  work organisation may give rise to compromises leading, in some cases, to an 
actual reduction of working time, the field  surveys also  show that adapted working hours do 
not  necessarily  lead  to  a  reduction  of working  time.  In  other  words,  while  changes  in 
production organisation most often involve a re-organisation of  hierarchical structures, internal 
mobility and increased multi-skilling, the removal of  the links between equipment use times and 
working hours,  task rationalisation and  therefore an  overall  improvement in  the competitive 
position of enterprises, the trade-off between income growth and free time may vary from one 
6 enterprise or one sector to another. Even in the case of interest to us  here,  i.e.  the choice in 
favour of a reduction of  working time,  it remains to be shown that this reduction has positive 
effects on employment. 
Factors of an institutional and political type may also limit the efficiency of collective policies 
to  reduce  working  time.  The  efficiency  of such  policies  is  closely  linked  to  the  nature  of 
industrial relations and relationships between the various actors (government,  employers and 
trade  unions).  It  may  well  be  that  countries  with  centralised  and  coordinated  bargaining 
systems and high levels of  trade union representation within enterprises have more of a chance 
of reaching negotiated agreements to reduce working time likely to promote employment.  A 
high  level  of coordination  and  articulation  of the  various  bargaining  levels  would  seem, 
however,  to be necessary,  but not enough on its  own,  to ensure the success of a policy  to 
reduce  working  time.  Consequently,  in  addition  to  the  evident  problems  of coordination 
between the various levels of social concertation (both national and European), the emergence 
of  compromises promoting employment is strongly conditioned by operators' practices and the 
objectives that they  support:  it  is  far  from  evident  therefore  that  a  collective  reduction  of 
working time will generate a convergence of  interests that leads to increased employment. The 
balances· to which negotiations of reductions of working time lead may  also prove to be less 
than optimal as regards employment. While it is generally accepted that a reduction of  working 
time improves the well-being of  employees (insiders), it has yet to be proven that the methods 
by  which  this  reduction  of working  time  is  implemented,  in  particular  the  level  of wage 
compensation,  are favourable to the unemployed (outsiders).  Most supporters of  job sharing 
often neglect these conflicts of interest and  implicitly  assume a solidarity between "insiders" 
and  "outsiders",  an  assumption which  seems to be very  restrictive when viewed against the 
growth and permanent nature of  mass unemployment. Uncertainties about the behaviour of  the 
social actors in relation to wage compensation levels give rise to uncertain results in terms of 
employment. It is therefore crucial to take account of the conflicting objectives of the social 
actors and to look carefully at the circumstances that may pave the way towards compromises 
that  promote employment.  Theoretical  developments  regarding  negotiation  models  shed  an 
interesting light on the uncertain impact of a reduction of  working time on employment.  These 
models show, in particular, that inadequate representation of the interests of the unemployed 
(outsiders)  in  collective bargaining and  the structure of the preferences of people with jobs 
(insiders)  as  regards  the trade-off between  income  and  free  time  both  run  counter to job 
sharing. 
Faced with the conflicting results, in terms of employment and unemployment, of general and 
authoritarian  policies  to  reduce  working  hours,  some  Member  States  have  introduced  tax 
incentive schemes to encourage enterprises to reduce working hours and to increase personnel 
7 numbers.  According to the promoters of these  measures,  the advantage of these schemes  is 
that  they  not  only  trigger  processes  to  reduce  working  time  but  also  reduce  enterprises' 
production  costs and  therefore  step  up  the impact  that  changes  in  working  hours  have  on 
employment.  Schemes of this type take two  di~erent forms.  Under the first  type of scheme, 
subsidies  are  available  for  enterprises  taking  steps  to  reduce  working  time.  Generally,  the 
award of  subsidies is subject to criteria of  recruitment or even the maintenance of  employment. 
Under the second type of scheme,  hourly social security rates are modulated as a function of 
working time (Rocard proposal)~ this scheme has yet to be applied in practice. 
Attempts to evaluate the efficiency of  the first type of scheme show that only a small number 
of enterprises have responded to this incentive.  This type of measure,  like policies to reduce 
wage costs, is  accompanied in  most cases by fairly  major side effects (windfall,  substitution, 
displacement effects,  etc.) that substantially reduce the efficiency of such financial  incentives. 
While  the impact  of reductions  of employers'  social  security  charges  on  the  propensity  of 
enterprises to set in motion collective processes to reduce working time does not seem clear-
cut,  it  would  seem  that these  schemes  have  had  more  success  from  the  point  of view  of 
developing certain individual forms of  reduced working time and in particular part-time work. 
In theory, tax incentive measures to reduce working time may,  under certain conditions, prove 
effective in the fight against unemployment, in particular of  the less skilled,  provided that they 
generate an increasing relationship between working time and the average hourly rate of social 
security contributions.  This type of public  measure to promote job sharing policies (Rocard 
proposal)  should  nevertheless  be  interpreted  with  caution  if it  is  not  accompanied  by  an 
evaluation of its impact on public finances.  In the favourable case in which these schemes on 
the one hand  encourage enterprises to reduce working time and,  on the other hand,  lead  to 
negotiated compromises that promote employment and  reduce unemployment,  the additional 
tax revenue (tax supplements) provided by additional recruitment may prove to be less than the 
public expenditure channelled into the reduction of social security contributions. It may well be 
that such systems are reflected by changes in the structure of compulsory levies and increases 
in  other categories of taxation  (or alternatively,  a  reduction  of public  expenditure  with  no 
change to the tax burden). It therefore appears paramount, in order to evaluate the net effects 
on employment of  a modulation of social security contributions, to analyse the impact of  these 
changes on the way in which wages are formed, the labour supply, household consumption and 
the  impact  of any  substitution  effects  linked  to  increases  in  the  tax  burden  on  growth, 
employment and unemployment. 
Contrary to first  impressions,  the  studies  analysed  would  seem  to  show that the  conditions 
under which  a reduction of working time  can  have  a long-term impact  on  employment  and 
unemployment are very restrictive. A general and uniform reduction of working time has more 
8 to do with a Taylorist conception ofwork organisation and production methods and no longer 
seems  to  be  in  keeping  with  enterprises'  new  production  constraints  and  employees' 
preferences.  While  most  opinion  surveys  show  that  people  are  generally.  in  favour  of a 
reduction of working time, they also show a considerable. diversity in people's preferences as 
regards reduced or adapted working time.  Moreover, while most people are in favour of such 
a reduction, they are generally unwilling to give up some form of wage compensation.  This 
does little to provide a favourable  context to the job sharing effect of a general reduction of 
working time.  The wide range of  individual preferences as regards the reduction or adaptation 
of working time  itself points in  the  direction of more flexible  adaptations of working time. 
While general and uniform reductions of  working time were undoubtedly necessary in the past, 
diversified  methods of adapting or reducing working time during working life  are nowadays 
more in keeping with employees' aspirations and enterprises' needs as regards competitiveness. 
9 1.  Introduction 
The  theme  of working  time  has  been  at  the  core  of the  social  debate  since  the  industrial 
revolution.  The focus of the debate has,  however,  changed over time.  After the First World 
War,  a certain number of legislative measures were introduced in  order to regulate working 
time.  The  main  aims  of these initial  laws  on working time,  which  introduced an  eight-hour 
working day,  were to combat the adverse effects of long working days on employees' mental 
and  physical health,  to combat the high  numbers of industrial  accidents  and  to regulate and 
standardise employers'  practices as regards working time.  During the thirty years after  1945 
and as working conditions began to improve and income started to grow, there was a change 
in  the focus  of the debate on working time.  There was a shift  away from  "health" concerns 
towards the issues surrounding  productivity gains,  the key one being people's choices as  to 
how to distribute the fruits of  growth between leisure and consumption. 
The rising imbalances and slackening off of  growth brought about by the first oil crisis led to a 
lively  and polemical debate about ways of reducing unemployment by a general reduction of 
working time in a certain number of  European countries. In some Member States, trade union 
organisations took a favourable  attitude towards a reduction or adaptation of working time, 
hoping for net job creation or at least for a curb on rising unemployment (safeguarding jobs). 
The economic impact of these aspirations,  in  some cases supported by  a set of legislative or 
contractual measures, seems to have differed. 
Although  the  debate  about  job  sharing  is  an  old  one
1
,  one  of the  new  elements  in  the 
resurgence of interest at the beginning of the 1980s, was the key place occupied by methods 
of implementing reductions or adaptations of working time.  Micro-economic analyses (  Anxo 
1987,  Catinat,  Cette  and  Taddei  1986)  had  shown  that  a  restructuring  of the  production 
process  reflected  by  an  increase  in  capital  use  times  made  it  possible  to  reconcile  both 
enterprises'  needs as  regards competitiveness (stability of production costs)  and  employees' 
aspirations for shorter working hours with no substantial loss of  income. The spin-off effects of 
a reduction  of working time  on employment  consequently depended greatly on methods  of 
implementation and the extent of the re-organisations carried out.  A set of macro-economic 
simulations was modelled  in  a large number of European countries  and  at  the level  of the 
European Community as a whole (Catinat, Donni and Taddei (1990)). Even though the results, 
in  terms  of net job creation,  varied  depending  on the  type  of macro-economic  model  used 
(Keynesian  or neo-classical),  these  simulations  made  it  possible  to  find  out  whether  their 
1  See in particular the debate during the 1930s (Anxo 1987, Cuvilier 1981, Sauvy 1967). 
11 results were in keeping with hypotheses on levels of  wage compensation, spin-off productivity 
gains and variations in equipment use times. While caution needs to be taken with this type of 
exercise,  especially in  view of hypotheses on the external nature of the labour supply and  of 
working hours and equipment use times, these simulations made it possible to confirm the key 
role  played  by  the  re-organisation  of production  methods  and  of work  organisation  in  a 
successful policy on working time. 
From the end of the 1980s, and in view of the disappointing results,  in terms of employment 
and unemployment,  of some national  experiments with a general reduction of working time, 
the debate took a new turn. There was a shift towards the problems raised by flexible methods 
of work organisation and the quest for  a competitive edge.  In  some highly  capital intensive 
segments  of industry,  the  pressures  being  exerted  by  the  internationalisation  of trade  and 
increasingly  high  levels  of competition  mean  that  enterprises'  production  practices  (just  in 
time,  lean  production)  are  tending  to  converge.  The  globalisation  of competition,  the 
introduction of new technologies and the gradual abandonment of Taylorist methods of work 
organisation have made it necessary to establish new labour force and production management 
methods. In a growing number of European enterprises, there has been a shift  away from the 
traditional system of  mass production based on strict task division towards more flexible forms 
of work organisation requiring  greater commitment  and  autonomy  on the  part  of workers, 
higher-level skills and  a wider range of skills  and  a re-organisation of hierarchical  structures 
(see Green Paper 1997). In many sectors (especially automobile engineering, see Bosch 1995, 
Lehndorff 1995),  this quest for  increased competitiveness has been reflected by  enterprises' 
attempts  to  improve  their  production  performance  by  extending  equipment  use  times  and 
introducing  new  and  innovative  methods  of organising  working  time  (  annualisation,  time 
banks, etc.). 
At  European  level,  improving  labour  flexibility  is  a  key  issue  in  efforts  to  improve  the 
employment  content  of economic  growth.  Fallowing  the  conclusions  of the  Extraordinary 
European Council on Employment in Luxembourg in November 1997, the Council adopted a 
Resolution  (15  December  1997)  on the  1998  Employment  Guidelines  intended  to improve 
enterprises'  and workers' capacities for  adaptation.  In  order to promote more modern work 
organisation,  the  social  partners were  asked to negotiate,  at  the  appropriate  level  (industry 
and/or  enterprise),  agreements  to  introduce  flexible  and  innovative  methods  of  work 
organisation  reconciling  enterprises'  requirements  as  regards  competitiveness  and  individual 
preferences as regards the division of  time between work, leisure and education. This quest for 
12 new  forms  of negotiated  flexibility  could,  for  instance,  take  the  form  of agreements  on 
reductions of  working time, the annualisation of  working hours, the reduction of overtime, the 
development of  part-time work, "lifelong" training and career breaks. 
13 2.  Objectives and presentation of the study 
The  main  objective  of this. report  is  to  try  to  pinpoint  the  main  lessons  to  be  learnt  from 
experiments with reduced or adapted working time through an analysis of a set of studies on 
working time carried out by or on behalf of the Commission and the European Foundation in 
Dublin over the last two years
2
.  We shall look in particular at the impact of reduced/adapted 
working time  on employment  and  unemployment  on the basis  of a  critical  review  of these 
documents. 
It was  evident  from  our initial  reading  of the  documents  that  the  themes  tackled  and  the 
methods  used  were very  different.  The  particularly wide  field  of investigation  ranges  from 
macro-economic studies (simulation) to micro-economic studies (monographs).  Some studies 
take a theoretical approach, while  others are  empirical  or forward-looking.  The studies also 
represent  a  whole  range  of disciplines  (sociology,  industrial  relations,  political  economics, 
econometrics, etc.). This lack of comparability reflects the plural and multidimensional nature 
of  the problems raised by working time. 
An initial  inventory of these studies made it  possible to classify documents around  a certain 
number of  topics. Some stud~es ([3],[8]) use macro-economic simulations to try to quantify the 
effects of a general reduction of working time.  These simulations relate either to all  Member 
States [8]  or to a small number of Member States (Germany, Belgium and France) [3].  Other 
studies,  taking  a  more  conceptual  approach,  use  national  experiments  [12]  or take  a  more 
global  approach  ([2],  [ 1  0])  in  an  attempt  to  summarise  what  conditions  are  needed  for  a 
reduction  or  adaptation  of working  time  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  competitiveness, 
employment and unemployment. 
Recent  European  Councils  have  stressed  that  a  tax  environment  more  favourable  to 
employment  needs  to  be  established.  The  current  structure  of the  taxation  system  in  the 
Member States, in particular labour taxation and the extent of the taxation wedge
3
,  seems to 
have had adverse effects on the growth of  employment, especially for less-skilled workers. This 
has given rise in recent years to thinking about the role of compulsory levies in trends in  and 
adjustments  of employment  and  working  time  over the  short-term  economic  cycle.  Some 
2  A complete list of the studies is given in the annex to  this report.  The figures  between brackets refer to  each 
. document. In view of  their wide-ranging nature [1] or the stage that they have reached [4], reports [1] and [4] will not 
be c;ritically analysed.  . 
3  The taxation wedge represents the difference between the cost of labour for  employers and the  net wage 
received by the employee. 
15 recent proposals have advocated a differentiated reduction of indirect labour costs through the 
establishment of a graduated system of employers'  contributions depending on working time 
(see the Rocard proposal).  Some Member States, such as France (see the Five-Year Law and 
the Robien Law) and Belgium (Global Plan), have introduced incentive schemes combining a 
reduction of employers'  charges with  a  reduction/adaptation of working time.  Two  studies 
([7],  [9])  summarise  and  evaluate  the  impact  of compulsory  levies  and  social  security 
contributions both on employment and the distribution of  working time.  These works attempt, 
moreover,  to  assess  policies  intended  to  combine  a  reduction  of employers'  charges,  a 
reduction of  working time and a redistribution of  employment. 
As  stressed above,  changes over the last twenty to thirty years in the organisation of labour 
and production methods have been reflected by a series of changes affecting the organisation 
and distribution of  working time.  All the documents listed look at the topic of flexible working 
hours over a week, a year or even a working life.  Even though this topic recurs so frequently, 
one  study  focuses  specifically  on  the  possibilities  of  improving  employment  and 
competitiveness by  improving  work organisation and  on recent developments  in  the area of 
contractual and working time flexibility in Europe, on the basis of  a survey conducted among a 
sample ofEuropean enterprises [5]. 
Other  studies  attempt  to  summarise  enterprises'  reactions  to  reduced  working  time  from 
enterprise monographs covering five Member States of the European Union [6].  Other works 
analyse the relationship between trends in working time and economic growth within the Union 
[ 11] and the links between the distribution of  working time and the distribution of  income [ 13]. 
The final  study [ 14] adopts a forward-looking point of  view and analyses the advantages of an 
improved link between working time and vocational training. 
This brief inventory highlights the wide range of  topics tackled and consequently the problems 
raised by any attempt to summarise them. The wealth and lack of  comparability of  this material 
has made it necessary for us to select documents for analysis and to focus our attention chiefly 
on the employment dimension of  the problems raised by working time.  This summary report is 
structured as follows.  Part I critically analyses macro-economic simulations carried out for the 
Commission in order to find  out what consequences a general reduction of working time has 
on  employment.  Three  main  topics  are  tacked  in  Part  II.  An  attempt  is  firstly  made  to 
summarise the body of  thought on methods of  implementing reduced or adapted working time 
and the conditions that are needed for such a reduction or adaptation to have a positive and 
sustainable effect on employment. We then look at the main development trends in the area of 
work organisation and flexibility  (contracts and  working time)  and the relationships between 
adapted/flexible  working  time  and  the  distribution  of  employment.  We  finally  review 
16 theoretical developments in the area of the relationships between fixed labour costs (structure 
of  compulsory levies, indirect labour costs), working time and employment. 
17 3.  Reduced  working  time  and  employment:  the  macro-economic 
approach 
3. 1  Introduction 
Analysis  of the  effects  of a  general  reduction  of working  hours  on  macro-economic 
equilibrium, employment and unemployment has given rise to a great deal of  literature over the 
last twenty to thirty years.  Although this may  seem somewhat simplistic,  some major lessons 
can be drawn from this work: 
~  The  results  achieved,  in  terms of growth,  employment  and  unemployment,  depend  to  a 
large extent on the types of models used (neo-classical, Keynesian or nee-Keynesian) and 
the  hypotheses  adopted  on  methods  of  reducing  working  time,  levels  of  wage 
compensation,  spin-off productivity  gains  and  the  impact  of reduced  working  time  on 
production capacity and equipment use times. 
);;- In general, macro-economic simulations show that a general reduction of  working time has, 
other things remaining equal,  an  adverse effect on economic growth.  Assuming that unit 
production costs increase either because of full  or partial compensation or because of an 
increase in  unit capital costs (linked to a possible decrease in  equipment use times), there 
are further  adverse effects  on growth.  The downturn in  growth is  due to the  combined 
effect of a decrease in  production capacity (supply)  and  a  deterioration of the terms  of 
trade (increased imports and reduced exports). However, if the reduction of working time 
leads to substantial productivity gains, for instance by closing up  gaps in the working day 
and  intensifying  work rates  (rationalisation,  fatigue  effect  and  motivation,  reduction  of 
absenteeism),  adverse effects on growth will then be lessened. In general, models taking a 
nee-Keynesian  approach tend in  most cases to overestimate the multiplier  effects,  via  a 
variation in aggregate demand, whereas models taking a neo-classical approach place more 
of  a stress on the spin-off effects of  a reduction of  working time on aggregate supply. 
~ From the point of view of the impact on employment and  unemployment,  hypotheses on 
production  cost trends  are  also  crucial.  An  increase  in  unit  labour  costs  in  most  cases 
brings  about  substitution  effects  between  labour  and  capital  and  adverse  effects  on 
production volume,  which  have  an  adverse  effect  on  the  demand  for  labour.  A general 
reduction of working time has positive effects on employment and  unemployment which 
are balanced when  reduced  working time  is  accompanied  by  a  reduction of production 
19 costs.  This reduction of production costs may  come either from  spin-off gains  in  labour 
productivity or from re-organisations of  production methods. 
3.2  Macro-economic simulations 
3.2.1  Federal Planning Bureau: The macro-economic consequences of policies to  reduce 
working time 
The first type of econometric simulation, conducted by the Federal Planning Bureau [3], uses 
the national  HERMES  simulation  models,  of a neo-Keynesian type,  to estimate the macro-
economic effects of two forms of reduced working time; a general reduction of working time 
and a more decentralised reduction combined with a re-organisation of production processes 
(increased equipment use times and/or an extension of  opening hours). The evaluation looks at 
three Member States (West Germany, Belgium and France).  Three scenarios are put forward 
for  each  group:  the  first  puts  forward  the  hypoth~sis of an  ex  ante  absence  of wage 
compensation  (same  hourly  wage),  the  second  scenario  supposes  full  compensation 
(maintenance of the per capita wage) and the third  scenario  adds a reduction of employers' 
social security contributions to this wage compensation. 
The hypotheses adopted for these two methods of reduced working time are summarised in 
Table 3.1  below: the extent to which the volume of hours worked is actually reduced (column 
2), the hourly productivity gains obtained from this reduction of  working time (column 3), the 
level of  wage compensation (column 4  ), the impact of  this reduced working time on equipment 
use times (elasticity of re-organisation,  column 5)  and lastly a variation in  employers'  social 
security contributions (column 6). 
20 Table 3.1: Hypotheses adopted 
Method by  Annual rate of  Rate of  Level of  ex  Elasticity of re- Employers' social 
which working  reduction of  increase in  ante wage  organisation  security 
time is reduced  working time  hourly  compensation  contributions 
productivity 
General 
reduction of 
working time 
(RWT) 
");- Scenario 1  ");- 0.01  ");- 0.1  ");- zero  ");- -0.3  ");- unchanged 
);.>- Scenario 2  );.>- 0.01  );.>- 0.3  );.>- full  );;- -0.3  );;- unchanged 
);.>- Scenario 3  );;- 0.01  );;- 0.3  );;- full  );;- -0.3  );.>- reduced 
Reduction/ 
re-organisation 
of  working time 
(2RWT)  . 
);.>- Scenario 4  );;- 0.008  );;- 0.3  ).- zero  );;- 1.7  );;- unchanged 
);.>- Scenario 5  );;- 0.008  );;- 0.3  );.>- full  );;- 1.7  );.>- unchanged 
);.>- Scenario 6  );.>- 0.008  );.>- 0.3  );;- full  );;- 1.7  );;- reduced 
Source: Federal Planning Bureau. 
In the case of a general  and  uniform  reduction of working time  (R  WT),  the annual  rate  of 
reduction of working time  over the period  1996-2000 for  all  employees  in  the  commercial 
sector is assumed to be 1%,  i.e.  the actual volume of hours worked has been reduced by 5% 
between  the  starting  year  ( 1996)  and  2000.  In  the  case  of a  reduction/re-organisation  of 
working time (2RWT), the annual level of reduction is 0.8%, i.e.  the volume of hours worked 
has  been  reduced  by  4%  by  2000.  It is  assumed,  for  both of these  reduced  working  time 
methods, that working hours remain unchanged from 2000. 
As regards spin-off productivity gains, the authors put forward the hypothesis of  an increase in 
labour productivity which, depending on the scenarios, varies between 10 and 30%. According 
to the authors, the hypothesis of lower productivity gains in the case of R  WT without wage 
compensation (scenario 1) is justified by the demotivating effect brought about by the lack of 
compensation (efficient wage). 
As  regards the  impact  of reduced working time  on  production capacity  and  equipment  use 
times, the hypothesis put forward is one of a decrease in the production capacity of  enterprises 
in the case of a general reduction of working time (R  WT) and an extension of equipment use 
times in  the case of a reduction/re-organisation of working time  (2RWT).  In the  latter case 
(2WRT) it is assumed that 1120 of enterprises (i.e.  one quarter of enterprises after five  years) 
21 will  re-organise production processes with a weekly reduction of working time  of six  hours 
and an increase in equipment use times of 10 hours
4
. 
Lastly, concerning the reduction of employers' social security contributions, it is assumed that 
the budget surpluses generated by full wage compensation are recycled in order to obtain an ex 
ante budget neutrality. 
3. 2. 1. 1 Discussion of  results 
As  is  common with  this  type  of simulation,  the  macro-economic  impact  of a  reduction  of 
working time  is  calculated  on the basis  of a variance  with  respect to  a  reference  scenario 
without reduced working time. 
Irrespective of  the scenario adopted, the impact of a general and uniform reduction of  working 
time (R  WT) on economic growth is  negative in  comparison with the reference scenario in  all 
three of  the countries studied.  All things remaining equal, the downturn in GDP is the greater, 
the higher the level of wage compensation. This downturn in growth can be attributed to the 
reduction  of production  capacity  due  to  the  lack  of any  re-organisation  of production 
processes,  making  enterprises  less  competitive  (loss  of  market  share).  This  drop  in 
competitiveness is largely due to the increase in unit production costs. This increase is  due to 
the combined effect of the increase in unit capital costs brought about by reduced equipment 
use times and the potential increase in wage costs (ex ante wage compensation)
5
. 
4  According to the authors of the report, this corresponds to  the introduction of system of three shifts,  each 
working 4 eight-hour days per week (32 hours per week) over a six-day week, i.e. a weekly equipment use time 
of 48  hours.  The flexibility  of re-organisation makes it possible  to  measure the effect  of a  1% variation in , 
working time on equipment use  times.  The authors put forward  the  hypothesis  of a  flexibility  of 1.7,  i.e.: 
flexibility of re-organisation= (dDUC/DUC)/-(DHIH)= ((48-38)/38)/ -((32-38)/38) = 1.7, where DUC and DH 
are the capital use time and working time respectively. 
5  It should also be noted that, even without ex ante wage compensation, the macro-economic loop effects (Phillips 
effect  linked  to  the  reduction  of unemployment)  push  wages  up  causing  tensions  on  the  labour  market  and 
consequently a downturn in economic activity. 
22 In the case of  the variants without wage compensation, the drop in consumption brought about 
by  the reduction of the available income of households exacerbates the depressive effect  on 
economic growth. While the downturn in  household consumption in the case of full  ex ante 
compensation is  not  as  great as  in  the  scenario  without wage compensation,  this  reduction 
does not offset the adverse  effects on  economic growth brought about by  the  reduction  of 
production capacity, the downturn in investment and the decrease in the volume of  exports. 
Adverse  effects  on economic growth are,  however,  attenuated when  wage compensation  is 
accompanied by  a reduction of employers'  social  security contributions,  since the increase in 
production costs brought about by the wage compensation are partly offset by the reduction of 
employers' charges. 
In  the case of a reduction/re-organisation of working time  (2R  WT),  changes to production 
processes,  reflected by  an  increase in  equipment use times,  have a positive effect,  all  things 
being  equal,  on  economic  growth.  The  simulations  also  show  that  the  results  in  terms  of 
improvements  in  growth  are  the  more  positive,  the  lower  the  level  of ex  ante  wage 
compensation.  In contrast to a general and  uniform reduction of working time without wage 
compensation,  a  re-organisation/reduction  of  working  time  (2R  WT)  without  wage 
compensation or even with full  wage compensation together with a reduction of employers' 
charges allows economic growth to be stepped up in a sustainable way in comparison with the 
reference scenario.  These good results can be attributed to the fact that enterprises are more 
competitive because unit production costs are reduced. The improvement of  the terms of  trade, 
in  particular  the  increase  in  exports,  makes  it  possible  to  offset  the  decline  in  private 
consumption resulting from the drop in households'  available income when the 2RWT is  not 
accompanied by wage compensation. When the 2R  WT with wage compensation is  combined 
with reduced social security charges, the positive effects on economic growth are due to the 
combined effect of the improvement in  external trade (as a result of increased equipment use 
times and reduced charges) and the increase in household consumption (as a result of the full 
compensation). 
Lastly,  the effects on economic growth of 2RWT accompanied by  full  wage compensation, 
without  accompanying  measures,  are  much  less  favourable  than  in  the  two  previous  cases 
because of  the increase in unit production costs. 
23 As  regards  effects  on  employment  and  unemployment,  the  simulations  seem  to  provide 
somewhat  conflicting  results  (see  Table  3.2  below).  Irrespective of the  scenarios  adopted, 
employment increases and unemployment decreases in comparison with the reference scenario. 
Overall,  the  effect  on  employment  and  unemployment  is  the  more  positive,  the  less  the 
reduction in the working time leads to an  increase in unit production costs.  In the long term 
(2005) and in comparison with the reference scenario, net job creation is  much greater when 
the reduction of  working time is not accompanied by ex ante wage compensation (more than 
one million jobs created and a reduction of the level  of unemployment by approximately one 
and  a half percentage points).  It should  be  noted,  nevertheless,  that these forms  of reduced 
working  time  are  in  most  cases  reflected  by  a  substantial  downturn  in  economic  growth 
especially  when  the  reduction  of working time  is  not  accompanied  by  a  re-organisation  of 
production processes.  While  the ')ob sharing"  effect  predominates in  these hypotheses, this 
runs counter to private household consumption (income effect). 
Table  3.2:  Results  of the  employment  and  unemployment  scenarios  (Variance  from  the 
reference scenario in 2005). 
Method by which working time is  Employment  Unemployment (in percentage point 
reduced  variances from the reference scenario, by 
country) 
General reduction of  working time 
(RWT) 
);>  Scenario 1  ~  1 060 000  ~  [-1.9  - -1.6] 
);>  Scenario 2  );>  210 000  ~  [-0.6  - -0.01] 
);>  Scenario 3  ~  660 000  ~  [-1.3  - -0.4] 
Reduction/re-organisation of 
working time (2R WT) 
~  Scenario 4  ~  1 022 000  ~  [-1.7  - -1.5] 
~  Scenario 5  ~  486 000  );>  [-1.0  - -0.6] 
~  Scenario 6  ~  995 000  ~  [-1.7  - -1.1] 
Source : Federal Planning Bureau 
Bearing in  mind the hypotheses adopted and the exploratory nature of these simulations,  the 
researchers  conclude  that  policies  involving  a  general  reduction  of working  time  have  a 
sustainable effect on employment and unemployment only if  there is no wage compensation or 
24 possibly  when  this  wage  compensation  ts  attenuated  by  accompanytng  public  measures 
intended to reduce wage costs (reduction of  employers' charges). 
Without  these  accompanytng  measures,  a  policy  involving  a  general  and  undifferentiated 
reduction of working time has a substantial negative effect on economic growth. In contrast, 
and bearing in mind the hypotheses adopted, policies to re-organise/reduce working time pave 
the way for "'an increase in the employment content of  growth and an upturn in growth itself, 
especially if  they are accompanied by a redistribution of  the  budget surpluses generated by 
the 2RWT taking the form of  a reduction of  social security contributions". 
3.2.2  Aries,  S.  Holland  [8] :  The  macro-economic  consequences  of  a  reduction/re-
organisation of working time 
This study, conducted by the Aries Institute and directed by  S.  Holland [8],  analyses,  like the 
previous study, the macro-economic consequences of  a reduction of  working time.  The macro-
economic simulations presented in this report were carried out by Alphametrics Royston.  The 
lack of a detailed  description of the  structure of the model  used  made  it  impossible for  us 
precisely to analyse the principal mechanisms conditioning effects on employment. Bearing in 
mind  the impressive results  obtained as  regards employment,  we  shall  assume  here that the 
model is of a Keynesian type.  In addition, the lack of a reference scenario common to all  the 
scenarios makes it difficult to carry out any comparative analysis with the previous study or to 
compare the different scenarios with one another. The report focuses chiefly on the impact of a 
reduction/re-organisation of working time on employment and  does not describe the spin-off 
effects of a reduction of working time on the other macro-economic variables (consumption, 
investment,  external trade balance,  unemployment t. No less than 24  scenarios are  analysed. 
The various evaluations cover all the Member States (with the exception of Sweden) and are 
based largely on a range of hypotheses external to the model  concerning trends in  economic 
growth and productivity. 
The first  set of scenarios [scenarios  1 to  12,  which are "control scenarios"  according to the 
author] contains no hypothesis on levels of  wage compensation. The scenarios differ chiefly in 
' 
6  Apart,  for  certain  scenarios,  from  the  spin-off  effects  of  reduced  working  time  and  possible  wage 
compensations on the GDP growth rate. See Table 3.4 below. 
25 terms of the extent of the reduction of working time (  5 or 1  0%) and different hypotheses on 
trends in economic activity (GDP growth rate and productivity growth rate). The second set of 
scenarios [scenarios 13  to 18] makes it possible, according to the author, to isolate the impact 
of  a variation in wage costs (without wage compensation, partial and full wage compensation) 
on a given level of economic growth. The only spin-off effect on growth is due to an increase 
in  aggregate  demand  brought  about  by  the  wage  compensation.  The  final  set  of scenarios 
[scenarios  19  to 24  which  are  the  most  realistic  according  to the  author]  differ  from  the 
previous  scenarios  in  that  use  ts  made  of different  hypotheses  on  trends  in  growth  and 
productivity. 
In the case of the first  set of scenarios [scenarios  1 to  12],  as GDP and productivity growth 
rates are assumed to be external, the implicit assumption is that a general reduction of  working 
time does not affect either GDP  or productivity growth rates.  It is  therefore possible to put 
forward  the hypothesis that the results given  reflect  a simple job sharing  effect.  Differences 
between the  different  scenarios  in  terms  of jobs created  can  be  attributed  to the  different 
hypotheses  on trends in  activity  and  variations  of annual  productivity levels.  The  lack  of a 
hypothesis on the level of wage compensation seems to confirm that the positive effects on 
employment are largely due to the application of  a simple rule of  three. The volume of  hours of 
work released by the reduction of working time is  "converted" into employment in  order to 
maintain a given level of economic growth.  Any  possible substitution effects between labour 
and capital and any possible impact on production capacity and their possible feedback effects 
on economic growth are therefore disregarded in this first set of  scenarios. 
In  the  second  set  of scenarios,  the  author  puts  forward  the  hypothesis  of a  GDP  and 
productivity growth rate that is external and stationary
7
. In comparison with t~e previous set of 
7  S.  Holland's report is somewhcv imprecise here. Page 27 of the report states that scenarios 13-18 "look at a 
pay feedback against fixed output and productivity growth", page 28 refers to "output and productivity trend as 
for  decade since  1985"  and lastly  Annex  1 states  that scenarios  13-18  "look at pay feedback  against static 
output and productivity". 
26 scenarios,  the difference here is  provided by the level of wage compensation
8  and its spin-off 
effect (feed-back) on aggregate demand and the level of economic activity and therefore the 
volume of  employment. A reduction of  working time accompanied by wage compensation has, 
in the simulations reported in this case, the effect of increasing household income and making 
economic growth more dynamic (multiplier effect). 
The final  set of scenarios [scenarios 19-24] differs from  the previous set in  t.hat  it  contains a 
hypothesis on growth trends (based on DG II forecasts and  common to all  scenarios 20-24) 
and  differentiated  trends  in  annual  productivity  levels.  This  final  set  of scenarios  which,  it 
should be borne in  mind,  is  presented by the author as  the most realistic,  has the advantage, 
like the previous study (Federal Planning Bureau), that it contains a reference scenario in which 
working hours are not reduced (scenario 20). Moreover, with the exception of scenario 19, the 
author puts forward the hypothesis of  partial wage compensation (sustained pay). 
\ 
3.2.2. 1  Discussion of  results 
The results reported in S. Holland's study show that impact on employment varies substantially 
both between the different sets of scenarios and between scenarios belonging to a same set of 
scenarios.  In general,  impact  on  employment  is  very  sensitive  to the  hypotheses  on  annual 
productivity  growth.  The  results  obtained  show that  the  impact  of a  general  reduction  of 
working time  on employment  is  a decreasing  function  of productivity.  In  other words,  the 
more productivity grows, the less effect there is on employment. The simulations also show 
8  The author of this report had some problems in understanding S.  Holland's hypotheses as regards levels of wage 
compensation.  Macro-economic  simulations  generally  take  account  of three  outline  cases:  by  lack  of wage 
compensation. modellers mean a reduction of  the per capita wage (monthly or annual) proportional to the reduction in 
working time, in other words an unchanged hourly wage, by partial compensation they mean a partial increase in the 
hourly wage and lastly in the case of  full wage compensation they mean that the hourly wage increases in proportion 
to the reduction in working time, so that the per capita wage remains unchanged. Three hypotheses on the level of 
wage  compensation  are  adopted  in  S.  Holland's  study:  a  general  reduction  of working  time  without  wage 
compensation,  with  wages  reduced  in proportion  to  working  time,  a  maintained wage  (or,  to  use  the  author's 
terminology, "sustained pay"), and lastly full  compensation,  i.e.  an increase in the hourly wage proportional to the 
reduction in working time. Bearing in mind the lack of precision of the term "sustained pay" (hourly or per capita?) 
and in view of the results  reported,  we  shall consider the category "sustained pay"  to  be similar to  partial wage 
compensation. 
27 that the employment effect is  an increasing function of the GDP growth rate.  Lastly,  and  in 
contrast to the previous study, the higher the wage compensation, the greater the impact on 
employment. This is due to the combined action of  the multiplier effects linked to the increase 
in  household  income  (income  effect)  and  the  reduction  of working  time  (sharing  effect). 
Consequently, the impact on employment is  maximum when economic growth is not affected 
by the reduction of working time but is  positively  affected by wage compensation (see,  for 
instance, scenarios 15 and 18  in  S.  Holland [8]). In these latter cases, a 5% or 10% reduction 
of  working time would increase employment in the European Community as a whole by  14 or 
30 million respectively over five years! 
As noted above, only the last set of scenarios [scenario 21-24], makes it possible to compare 
the impact on employment of a reduction of  working time with respect to a reference scenario 
[scenario 20] in which working ti.me is not reduced. 
For all  the  scenarios,  the author,  in  his  analysis  of the results,  argues  in  favour of spin-off 
productivity gains of the order of 50%,  the reduction in  working time being divided  equally 
between increased productivity and increased employment. In other words, and on the basis of 
the works of Bosch and Lendorff,  S.  Holland would tend to consider that the gross effects on 
employment given in  Table 3.4 should be readjusted downwards by some 40%.  In Table 3.3 
below, we have taken the impact of  productivity gains into account in order to estimate the net 
effect on employment in  comparison with the reference scenario.  By way of comparison, the 
net impact on employment using the hypotheses on productivity gains set out in the previous 
study by the Federal Planning Bureau, i.e. 30 %, is shown in brackets. 
Table 3.3: Net variation in employment in comparison with the reference scenario 
Sets of  scenarios  Reduction in working time(%)  Net variation in employment in comparison with 
the reference scenario (%) 
Third set 
[Scenarios 19-24] 
~  Scenario 21  ~  5%  ~  + 130% ( + 169%) 
);.>- Scenario 23  );.>- 10%  );.>- + 303 % ( + 370 o/o) 
28 Comparison of these two studies clearly  shows the disproportionate nature of the results in 
terms  of job  creation.  In  the case  of the Federal  Planning  Bureau,  the  spin-off effects  on 
employment of a reduction of working time of 5% with wage compensation vary,  depending 
on the methods of implementation, between 0.4% and 0.9% in comparison with the reference 
scenario.  As Table 3.3  shows, the effect of a reduction of working time of the same order of 
magnitude (Scenario 21,  5%) would increase employment by  130% to  169% in  comparison 
with  the  reference  scenario  on the  basis  of the  hypotheses  on  spin-off productivity gains! 
Results as regards the impact of a reduction of working time on economic growth are also 
diametrically  opposed.  Whereas  the  evaluations  of the Federal  Planning  Bureau  showed  a 
substantial negative effect (some -1% in  comparison with reference scenario), in  S.  Holland's 
study, wage compensation has appreciable effects on economic growth (around+  1  %). 
3.3  Comments 
The main objective of this section is to examine whether the hypotheses adopted are credible 
and whether the results of the two sets of macro-economic evaluations described  above  are 
valid. 
Conventional macro-economic models do not in general take very good account of operators' 
behaviour  and  strategy.  These  models  have  not,  moreover,  been  specifically  formulated  to 
evaluate  the  macro-economic  impact  of policies  to  reduce  and  adapt  working  time.  In 
particular,  the  rudimentary  nature  or even  absence  of external  relationships  reflecting,  for 
instance, the implications for the labour supply, national methods of  wage formation, cotnpany 
recruitment  strategies and  work organisation,  etc.,  should  encourage readers to  view  these 
studies with some caution and to consider the evaluations as  no  more than exploratory.  As 
stressed above,  an  analysis of the macro-economic consequences of a reduction of working 
time  makes  it  necessary  to  formulate  hypotheses  external  to  the  model  concerning  key 
variables, such as levels of wage compensation, spin-off productivity gains and equipment use 
times.  As the analysis of the two studies commissioned by the Commission shows, there are 
substantial  variations  in  the  results  obtained,  in  particular  in  terms  of employment  and 
economic growth, depending on the hypotheses "external to the model" used by the modellers. 
29 An  understanding of the  relationships between working time  and  these external variables  is 
therefore crucial in any assessment of  the validity of  the results. 
Relationship between stated and actual working time 
The macro-economic evaluations surveyed by this report are based on the assumption that a 
reduction of working time  is  reflected  by  a proportional  reduction  of the volume  of hours 
actually worked.  The first  key  question is  to find  out whether this  hypothesis  is  valid.  The 
relationship  between  methods  of implementing  policies  to  reduce  working  time  and  their 
impact  on  actual  working time  are  crucial  in  evaluating  the  potential  impact  of policies  to 
reduce working time  on  employment.  In  other words,  we feel  that  it  is  crucial  to  examine 
whether  a  reduction  of stated  working  time  (statutory  or under  collective  agreements)  is 
reflected de facto by a proportional reduction of actual working time.  The French example is 
revealing here and provides a good example. The Popular Front reduced the statutory working 
week to  40  hours in  1936.  It was  not,  however,  until  the beginning  of the  1980s that the 
statutory working week in France tallied with the actual working week (i.e.  over 40 years!). 
This  rather extreme case  shows that there is  a complex  relationship  between working  time 
regulated  by  law  or  collective  agreement  and  actual  working  time  and  that  the  public 
authorities  can  seldom  take  direct  action  on  actual  working  time.  There  are  nevertheless 
grounds  for  thinking  that  a  reduction  of working  time  at  industry  level,  because  of its 
negotiated nature, is likely to have  more of an effect on the volume of  hours actually worked. 
The implementation of industry-wide agreements at  enterprise level  may  lead,  however,  to a 
reduction of  actual working time that is less than set out in the collective agreement as a result, 
in particular, of  the different levels of coverage of collective agreements.  The actual reduction 
ofworking time may therefore be less.than proportional to the statutory or collectively agreed 
reduction which, in the short and medium term at least, reduces the potential effects of a policy 
to reduce working time on employment and unemployment. 
Irrespective of the methods by which a reduction of working time is implemented, the micro-
economic behaviour of  operators facing a statutory or collectively agreed reduction of  working 
time is  a key element in  analysing the relationship between normal  and  actual working time. 
From  the  employers'  point  of view,  the  fact  that  fixed  wage  costs  are  involved  in  the 
management  of  the  work  force  (turnover  costs,  administrative  costs,  training  costs, 
30 compulsory  levies,  etc.)  may  have  an  impact  on  unit  production  costs  and  the  volume  of 
employment in the case of  a reduction of  working time.  These costs do not depend on working 
time  but vary  depending  on personnel  numbers.  A reduction  in  working time  increases the 
relative proportion of  these costs with respect to variable wage costs. When working time has 
to be  reduced,  enterprises therefore have  an  incentive to  reduce  personnel  numbers  and  to 
increase the working time of their employees.  This  may be reflected either by an increase in 
overtime  or,  more  generally,  by  a  change  in  the  distribution  of working  time  within  the 
enterprise (increasing the hours worked by part-time personnel, for instance).  It may well be, 
therefore, that the impact of a reduction of working hours on the distribution of working time 
is such that the volume of employment remains unchanged or decreases, following a reduction 
of working time,  even when the volume of production remains the  same  (see Anxo  (1987), 
Hart (1987), Calmfors and Hoel (1984)).  Similarly, employees may also try to offset any loss 
of  income by increasing their average working time. The extent of  these spin-off effects on the 
labour supply varies, however, depending on the level of wage compensation, the distribution 
of  working time and income and individual choices between leisure and consumption. 
The  absence  of these  adjustment  mechanisms  from  the two  sets  of simulation  studies  may 
therefore mean that the potential effects of a reduction of working time  on employment and 
unemployment have been over-evaluated. 
Level of  wage compensation 
As  noted above, the macro-economic simulations show that the level of wage compensation 
has a major impact on the effects of a reduction of working time.  In the case of enterprises 
having to compete, the increase in  unit labour costs brought about by wage compensation is 
likely,  when production remains  constant,  to bring about  substitutions of capital for  labour, 
which does little to promote employment.  Higher production costs mean that enterprises are 
less competitive (fewer outlets) and have a negative impact on overall production levels which 
exacerbates the  adverse  effects  on the  demand  for  labour (competitiveness  effect).  From a 
macro-economic point of view,  losses of market shares are  also  reflected by a downturn in 
exports  and  therefore  a reduction in  overall  demand  and  a  downturn in  economic  growth. 
While  it  is  true that wage compensation has  a favourable  impact  on consumer demand,  as 
household  incomes  are  increased (income  effect),  it  does  not  have  a favourable  impact  on 
31 enterprises'  investment  demand  stnce  it  adversely  affects  their  profitability.  Wage 
compensation leads,  therefore, to inflationary effects which reduce domestic demand (actual 
spending effect) and exports. The Federal Planning Bureau's evaluations take account of  these 
effects  and,  as  noted  above,  the  hypotheses  adopted  on  wage  compensation  shape  the 
employment effect of the various methods of reducing working time to a considerable extent. 
In contrast,  S.  Holland's evaluations show a diametrically opposite impact,  since the greater 
the wage compensation, the more substantial the impact on employment. These surprising and 
highly  optimistic  results  are undoubtedly  due  to the fact  that only job  sharing  and  income 
effects are taken into account in the simulations, whereas production factor substitution effects 
and competitiveness effects are disregarded. Modelling of  this type does little for the credibility 
of the results obtained.  In an unbalanced economy,  subject to competition,  the question that 
has to be raised is not how many jobs enterprises, faced with a reduction of  working time,  are 
willing to create or safeguard in order to maintain a given level of production. For enterprises 
whose main concern is one of  profitability, the balance between the volume of  employment and 
production is not independent of  trends in production costs. 
Spin-off  productivity gains 
All  things being equal, the productivity gains brought about by a reduction of working time 
reduce  production costs  and  reduce  the  adverse  effects  of a  reduction  of the use  times  of 
production factors on the volume of production. These gairis,  as we have seen, may be due to 
the  elimination  of dead  times  during  the  working  day  and  more  intensive  working  rates 
(rationalisation, fatigue effect and motivation, reduction of absenteeism).  While the existence 
of spin-off productivity gains has  a favourable  effect  on enterprises'  production costs,  these 
potential gains also reduce the sharing effect of  a reduction of  working time for a given level of 
production, in the short term at least. It should also be borne in mind that, in the longer term, 
the  increase  in  labour  productivity  has  a  favourable  effect  on  the  competitiveness  of 
enterprises,  households'  available  income,  economic  growth  and  therefore  ultimately  on 
employment. 
The problem,  empirical in nature,  is  to find  out whether positive effects can be  expected and 
whether these potential productivity gains are permanent or transitory (linked,. for instance, to 
the productivity cycle). 
32 A number of econometric studies (see for instance Anxo  &  Bigsten,  1989,  Cueva &  Heyer, 
1997 and Hart & MacGregor, 1988) have been conducted in recent years in order to estimate 
the effects of  a reduction of  working time on labour productivity. These studies have provided, 
however, conflicting results.  Some empirical studies confirm that there are substantial spin-off 
gains, whereas others point to negative effects. These latter results do not, however, mean that 
some enterprises are  not in  a position to step up  labour productivity when working time  is 
reduced.  What these econometric estimations show is  that,  o~ the one hand,  initial  working 
time has to play a key role in the appearance of productivity gains and that, on the other hand, 
it is unlikely that these gains will be distributed uniformly throughout the economy. In the case 
of the two simulations  studied in  this report,  the Federal Planning Bureau puts forward the 
hypothesis of  an ex ante increase in productivity of  between 10 and 3  0%, whereas S.  Holland's 
study assumes ex post spin-off productivity gains of 40 to 50%.  While the Federal Planning 
Bureau's hypotheses do not differ from other macro-economic simulations, the hypothesis of 
an  ex post increase  in  the  latter  study  has  a  series  of evident  conceptual  drawbacks.  The 
parameters used  by  the Federal  Planning  Bureau make  it  possible  internally  to analyse  the 
variation in productivity gains in respect of macro-economic variables, whereas, in the case of 
S.  Holland,  the impact on employment is  corrected ex post by  the application of a criterion 
external to the model and valid for all  14 countries studied, which detracts from the validity of 
the results obtained. 
Variations in equipment use times 
A reduction of  working time does not just have an impact on the volume of  hours worked but 
also on equipment use times. Recent theoretical works (Anxo et al (1995) and Catinat, Cette & 
.  Taddei (1994)) have highlighted the importance of variations in  equipment use times  in  the 
efficient promotion of  employment and economic growth by a reduction of  working time. 
For a given distribution of  the volume of  work between different shifts, a reduction of  working 
time leads to a reduction of  capital use times. The works cited above have shown that, in such 
a case,  unit production costs could be kept stable only under very restrictive conditions.  The 
main cause lies in the fact that a reduction of equipment use times increases the cost of use of 
capital  per  unit  produced.  In  the  case  of enterprises  that  are  highly  capital  intensive,  the 
33 objective of cost stability  makes it  necessary to reduce the  hourly  wage,  even  assum1ng  a 
substantial increase in labour productivity. If, in contrast, there are zero productivity gains, this 
same  objective  makes  it  necessary  to  reduce  the  hourly  wage  irrespective  of the  capital 
intensity of the enterprise in question.  Under these circumstances, it may well be,  as  stressed 
above, that a general reduction of  working time increases unit costs even if  this reduction is not 
accompanied by  wage compensation.  This  observation  suggests in  turn that a  reduction  of 
working time may have adverse effects on the competitiveness of enterprises and therefore on 
the growth of  production and employment, especially in sectors exposed to competition. 
An increase in equipment use times makes it possible, in contrast, for enterprises to avoid the 
reduction  of production  capacity  connected  with  a  reduction  of working  time  and  even 
substantially to improve their profitability.  The studies cited above have shown that a major 
restructuring of  the production process, intended to increase equipment use times, would make 
it  possible to reconcile both the enterprise's requirements for  competitiveness and  workers' 
aspirations to reduce their working time with no  substantial loss of income.  This would then 
make it  possible for the enterprise to reduce working time with wage compensation even if 
labour  productivity  remains  unchanged.  The  restructuring  of the  production  process  has, 
however, to be substantial enough to be able to offset the increase in unit costs brought about 
by the reduction of  working time. 
It should  nevertheless be  stressed that even though some  enterprises may be able  to  offset 
increases  in  production  costs  by  extending  equipment  use  times,  it  may  well  be  that  this 
possibility does not exist at the level of  the economy as a whole. An increase in equipment use 
times  at  a  more  aggregated level  requires  a  degree  of flexibility  of work organisation and 
considerable adaptability of production methods.  At a macro-economic level,  the average use 
times of  equipment may therefore at best remain unchanged and at worst decline. 
Empirical  studies  analysing  the  relationships  between  employment,  working  time  and 
equipment use times are rare. One study (Anxo and Taddei (1995)) attempts to fill this gap by 
describing trends in  equipment use times in  five  European countries.  This  study shows that 
trends  in  equipment  use  times  have  been  almost  stationary in  these countries  over the  last 
twenty years. This trend in equipment use times is interesting as it would seem to confirm the 
hypothesis  that  a  reduction  of working  time  is  accompanied  in  the  long  term  by  a  re-
34 organisation of  production methods involving sustained or even increased equipment use times. 
A more detailed examination of the medium-term data does not seem,  however,  to bear out 
this hypothesis. The reduction in working time that took place during the 1970s has ended in a 
reduction of  average weekly equipment use times despite the growth of shift work. In addition, 
the reversal of the trend, at the beginning of the 1980s, reflected by increased shift work and 
extended equipment use times,  coincides, in these countries, with stable or extended working 
time. Looking solely at trends in industrial employment, the stationary nature of  equipment use 
times over the long term has coincided with an increase in capital intensity, a relative increase 
in shift work and a decline in industrial employment.  The hypotheses adopted, for the macro-
economic  simulations,  of extended  or  sustained  use  times  would  therefore  seem  to  be 
questionable from  an  empirical  point of view  and  it  may  well  be  that the  most  pessimistic 
scenarios are actually borne out. However, while the Federal Planning Bureau's hypotheses on 
the medium-term ( 10 years) impact of  a reduction of  working time appear, all in all, to be fairly 
prudent (assuming a re-organisation of production methods by 25% of enterprises), these re-
organisations  nevertheless  involve  an  increase  of 10  hours  in  weekly  equipment  use  times 
which,  in the light of the historical trend in  equipment use times,  is fairly high.  In the .  second 
study, the lack of hypotheses on the impact of a reduction of working time on equipment use 
times is very problematic and raises questions about the validity of  the results obtained
9
. 
Reduction of  working time,  comparability of  the labour force and labour supply 
As a result of their aggregate nature, macro-economic models assume that the labour force is 
comparable  and  completely  mobile  in  both  geographical  and  occupational  terms.  The  two 
studies analysed here are both subject to this constraint of aggregation.  The hypothesis of a 
complete fluidity of and a full  match between the labour supply and demand detracts from the 
explanatory abilities of  the models used, especially as regards the spin-off effects of  a reduction 
of working time on unemployment. Many studies have shown that the individual and regional 
distribution of unemployment is far from uniform at both national and European Community 
level and that mass unemployment may go hand in  hand with a shortage of skilled labour. It 
may well be, therefore, that a reduction of  working time exacerbates imbalances on the labour 
· 
9  The simulations  conducted by  Alphametrics  implicitly assume  that equipment use  times  are  maintained, 
which, at the level  of 14 countries and over a five-year period, does not seem very likely because of the very 
substantial increase in shift work that such a hypothesis would require. 
35 market These labour force matching problems may in particular create bottlenecks leading in 
tum  to  inflationary  tensions  in  certain  labour  market  segments  and  ultimately  reducing 
poten~ial effects on employment. It is  unlikely,  moreover,  that a reduction of working time, 
without accompanying measures, will in itself improve the employability of  jobseekers or, for 
instance, that the long-term unemployed will be more likely to find jobs. 
The macro-economic models discussed in this report put forward the hypothesis of an external 
labour force.  This hypothesis is restrictive and it may well be that a reduction of  working time 
may not only have an impact on resource allocation within enterprises, but may also modify the 
level and composition of  the labour supply. People who much prefer a shorter working day (in 
particular women) may enter the labour market and the concomitant increase in  participation 
rates may help to limit the impact of  a reduction of  working time on unemployment. Moreover, 
if  the reduction of  working time, assuming the favourable hypothesis of a substantial effect on 
unemployment, improves the labour market situation, this improvement may have an impact on 
the total labour supply (changes in  activity rates) and  consequently on overall activity rates. 
While  the simulations produced by  the Federal Planning Bureau seem to have taken partial 
account of these spin-off effects on the labour supply, the same cannot be said of the second 
study  which,  in  most  cases,  identifies  the  spin-off increase  in  employment  with  an  almost 
proportional reduction in unemployment! 
The hypothesis that the reduction of working time is limited to the commercial sector,  in the 
case the Federal Planning Bureau's evaluations, also raises a certain number of problems. It is 
unlikely  that  public  sector  employees  will  passively  accept,  for  obvious  reasons  of social 
justice,  a reduction of working time  limited  to the  commercial  sector.  Extending  a general 
reduction of  working time to the economy as a whole obviously raises problems from the point 
of  view of  its financing especially in a context of  budget cutbacks and tight controls over public 
deficits.  Lastly,  in  the same study,  the drop  in  unemployment recorded in  the three Member 
States of  the European Community due to the increased competitiveness of  enterprises, may be 
reflected by a downturn in  employment in  the other Member States. If there is  no  change,  it 
may well be that the unemployment level remains unchanged in all the Member States. 
In conclusion,. the simulations analysed highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the macro-
economic  approach.  Among  these  strengths,  the  possibility  of modelling  separate  sets  of 
36 scenarios  makes  it  possible  to  assess  whether  results  are  in  keeping  with  the  hypotheses 
adopted.  These  macro-economic  simulations  highlight,  in  particular,  the  importance  of the 
methods  by  which  working  time  policies  are  implemented  and  their  consequences  on  the 
efficiency  of policies  to  reduce  working  time  from  the  point  of view  of employment  and 
economic growth. However, the lack of  information on the micro-economic foundations of  the 
adaptation mechanisms implemented and the external nature of some key variables such as the 
level  of wage  compensation,  spin-off productivity  gains  and  the  impact  of reductions  of 
working time on equipment use times obviously represents a weakness.  The micro-economic 
behaviour of economic  operators (enterprises,  workers,  social  partners)  is  necessarily,  as  a 
result  of the  level  of aggregation  of the  models,  extremely  simplified  and  takes  only  very 
insufficient account of the adjustment mechanisms described above.  These mechanisms, as we 
have seen, may substantially reduce the positive results expected from job sharing policies.  In 
this context, critical analysis of the validity of the hypotheses adopted, especially in respect of 
the  evaluations  reported  by  S.  Holland,  leads  us  to  consider  that  the  results,  in  terms  of 
employment and unemployment, are undoubtedly over-estimated. 
37 4.  Reductions  of  working  time  and  employment:  an  approach 
based on micro-economics and monographs 
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to summarise the studies about the ways in which 
reductions of  working time can be implemented and the conditions that need to be satisfied if  a 
reduction  of working  time  is  to have  a  positive  and  sustainable  effect  on competitiveness, 
employment and unemployment.  The second part of the chapter looks at the efficiency of the 
various  systems  of reducing  employers'  charges  in  encouraging  enterprises  to  reduce  their 
working time and to work towards job sharing. 
4.1  Reductions  of working  time  and job  sharing:  paving  the  way  for job 
creation 
Our critical analysis is based on four studies commissioned by the European Commission and 
the European Foundation in Dublin.  The first two studies ([2]  &  [10]),  by G.  Bosch and B. 
Marin,  take  a  conceptual  and  normative  approach  and  examine  the  best  ways  in  which  a 
successful  policy  on  working  time  can  be  implemented.  The  third  study,  produced  by  D. 
Taddei  for  the  European  Foundation  in  Dublin,  attempts  to  pinpoint,  from  enterprise 
monographs describing experiments with reductions of working time in five Member States of 
the European Community
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,  the way  in  which these reductions were implemented  and  their 
impact on employment, productivity and working conditions. 
As we stressed in the introduction, the changes that have taken place over the last twenty to 
thirty years in labour and production method organisation have been reflected by a number of 
changes  affecting  the  organisation  and  distribution  of working  time.  The  fourth  study  [5], 
conducted  by  the  Cranfield  Institute,  examines,  from  a  sample  of European  enterprises, 
developments in the area of  contract and working time flexibility in Europe. 
The extreme wealth and diversity of  the materials surveyed is striking  .. The ambitious goals and 
the extent of the field  covered by these studies combined with the sociological and economic 
dimensions of  the topics tackled, made it necessary for us to make restrictive or even reductive 
choices which, we hope, do not betray the authors' thinking. Bearing in mind this diversity, we 
shall  focus  chiefly  on  collective  methods  of reducing  working  time  and  their  impact  on 
employment and will look only briefly at more individual forms of  reduced working time (part-
time work, parental leave, progressive retirement, etc.). Even a collective reduction of  working 
10  Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
39 time  may,  however,  take  different  forms  (daily,  weekly,  annual  reduction,  etc.)  and  the 
methods by which reductions of  working time are implemented may have a differing impact on 
enterprise performance and  employment.  The  problems  of working time  cannot be  reduced 
simply to the  dimension  of employment  since  other objectives  may  be  involved:  improving 
social well-being and the quality of  life of  households, facilitating transitions between different 
types  of activity  during  life  or  promoting  a  more  egalitarian  gender  division  between 
production and  domestic  activities.  In  any  case  and  irrespective  of the  objectives  pursued, 
reductions of  working time have an economic impact that cannot be disregarded. 
As  most  of the  authors  stress,  the  reduction  and  redistribution  of working  time  ts  not  a 
universal panacea for unemployment and, if  it is to be effective, must meet a certain number of 
conditions.  A  theme  that  recurs  in  the  studies  analysed  is  that  the  efficiency,  in  terms  of 
employment,  of reductions of working time  seems to be highly  dependent on the  conditions 
under  which  these  reductions  are  implemented  and  the  institutional,  social  and  economic 
environment in which economic operators are working.  Overall,  the authors are nevertheless 
convinced that reduced working time is,  in parallel with more traditional measures to support 
employment, an efficient way of  combating unemployment. The various authors also stress the 
need to find  new types of social compromise promoting a new organisation of time likely to 
have a favourable  impact  on employment.  If these new policies  on  working time  are  to  be 
efficient,  they  cannot  be  implemented  in  a  mechanical  way,  but  must  reconcile  both  the 
requirements of enterprises as regards competitiveness and  people's individual preferences as 
regards their overall working hours and the times at which they actually work. 
The methods by which reductions of working time can be implemented,  and in  particular the 
type of social dynamic able to generate a virtuous circle reconciling workers'  preferences for 
more  free  time  (and  greater  control  over  their  working  hours)  with  improvements  in  the 
competitiveness  of enterprises  represent  a  first  area  for  examination.  The  ways  in  which 
working time can be reduced, the nature of industrial relations and bargaining methods seem, 
in  this  case,  to play a key role in  reconciling sometimes diverging interests.  In other words, 
most  authors  attempt to pinpoint which  types  of new  social  compromise  can  reconcile  the 
sometimes  conflicting  objectives  of economic  efficiency  and  social  justice.  The  conditions 
under which reductions of working time can create or safeguard jobs represent a second area 
of examination.  In  particular,  which forms  of reduced working time  and  which  methods  of 
implementation  are  most  likely  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of enterprises,  economtc 
growth and to reinforce any potential job sharing effects. 
40 4.1. 1  Factors promoting job sharing 
Over the  last  ten years,  various  theoretical  developments,  based  in  most  cases  on  nucro-
economic optimisation models, have made it possible to pinpoint a number of  factors that help 
reductions of working time to have an efficient impact on employment. Without wishing to be 
simplistic,  a reduction of working time  may  have  a  positive  impact  on employment if it  is 
accompanied  by  a  re-organisation  of production  methods  that  makes  enterprises  more 
competitive. In general, these theoretical studies show that a reduction of working time has a 
particularly  good  effect  on  employment  when  it  is  accompanied  by  a  reduction  of unit 
production costs. This reduction of  unit production costs may be the result of  an improved use 
of  equipment (increased equipment use times or extended opening hours), spin-off productivity 
gains linked to the reduction of working hours or an improved match between working time 
and  short-term  economic  and  seasonal  fluctuations  in  activity.  If,  however,  a  reduction  of 
working  time  goes  together  with  a  decrease  in  equipment  use  times  and/or  a  wage 
compensation that is not compatible with sustained or reduced unit production costs, effects on 
employment  will  be negative.  While  the  case  studies  examined  by  the  various  documents 
analysed  here  (see  below)  stress  the  important  part that  re-organisation  processes  play  in 
ensuring  that  reductions  of working  time  have  a  positive  effect  on  employment,  the  field 
surveys  also  show that the conditions under which  reductions  of working time  can have  a 
positive effect on employment are restrictive, at least at a more aggregate level. 
In addition to these factors,  some authors (especially [2] &  [ 1  0]) examine the impact that the 
far-reaching  changes  that  have  taken  place  over  the  last  twenty  to  thirty  years  in  the 
organisation of labour and production processes has had on the emergence of new forms  of 
working time which may be reflected in some cases by a negotiated reduction of working time 
likely to promote employment. 
In  the  first  place,  the  abandonment  of Taylorist  methods  of work  organisation  by  some 
enterprises has been reflected by increased multiskilling and has extended the internal mobility 
of the  labour force.  In the  opinion  of some  authors  ([2]  &  [10]),  these  changes  promote 
adaptations/reductions of  working time. The introduction of new forms of calculating working 
hours on an annual basis or even during working life (thematic,  parental, training leave,  etc.) 
require the internal work force to be relatively multi-skilled and to possess a certain degree of 
internal mobility. Replacing absent employees means, for instance, that tasks and duties have to 
be re-allocated within the enterprise; this is facilitated by these changes in work organisation. 
It also  seems to be easier to adjust  and  reduce  working hours  in  enterprises  in  which  the 
delegation of  responsibilities is encouraged (modification of  hierarchical structures). 
41 A shift from pay systems based on working hours to systems based on monthly pay may also 
make  the  introduction  of new  forms  of working  time  more  acceptable  to  employees.  The 
guarantee of a fixed  income irrespective of changes in  tasks and therefore in  working hours 
encourages the introduction of  new forms of  managing working time which may be reflected in 
some enterprises by a reduction of  working time. 
Moreover,  as  stressed by  G.  Bosch [2],  some types of social  and industrial  relations within 
enterprises (quality of social dialogue, representativeness of personnel and active participation 
by employees) are more likely to lead to negotiated agreements promoting some forms of  job 
sharing.  The  fact  that  these  new  methods  of organising  working  time  (  annualisation  for 
instance)  are  less  transparent than  more  comparable  traditional  standards  of working  time, 
requires a greater degree of active participation and  monitoring by workers'  representatives 
and  increased  access  to  information.  Some  procedures  by  which  the  social  partners  are 
consulted  and  participate  may  also  be  better than  others  at  shaping  choices  that  promote 
employment.  Negbtiated  agreements  can  in  particular  lead  to  a  substantial  reduction  of 
employees'  actual working time in return for a flexibility that is  not welcomed in  some cases 
because working hours are more variable and less predictable (shorter notice of  changes). 
In other words,  a reduction of working time is  more likely to entail compromises promoting 
employment within enterprises that have introduced measures promoting functional flexibility. 
It should be stressed, however, that while flexible  working hours make it possible to stabilise 
employment during the short-term economic cycle,  they also  reduce external mobility.  While 
the introduction, moreover, of more flexible forms of  work organisation promotes adaptations 
of  working time and in some cases increases employees' well-being, it has yet to be shown that 
enterprise  bargaining  l~ads  to  substantial  reductions  of working  time  and  negotiated 
compromises that promote employment. 
4.1.2  Trigger factors and impact on employment: what can be learnt from enterprise 
monographs 
As stressed above, some studies (D.  Taddei [6]) attempt to draw lessons from experiences of 
reducing or adapting working time within enterprise from enterprise monographs conducted in 
five  Member  States  of the  European  Community.  Taking  an  inventory  of national  studies 
conducted  during the  period  1988-1995  as  a  starting  point,  D.  Taddei  concentrates,  in  his 
analysis of the behaviour of enterprises faced with a reduction of working time,  on two main 
themes: on the one hand, those factors that trigger reductions of  working time and negotiation 
and  implementation procedures for reductions  of working time  and,  on the other hand,  the 
42 impact of reductions of working time  on  employment and  the other economic indicators of 
enterprises. 
New and  innovative forms  of work organisation that involve  an  adaptation or reduction of 
working  time  are  often  introduced  as  a  result  of changes  in  the  economic  and  social 
environment of enterprises.  As D.  Taddei rightly stresses, a reduction of working time is  not 
generally an objective of enterprises with the result that they do not introduce such reductions 
at their own initiative.  Analysis of the case studies clearly shows that reductions of working 
time  are  more  often  the  result  of collective  bargaining  within  enterprises.  Examination  of 
bargaining processes also  shows that,  in  most of the cases observed,  the bargaining  process 
was set in motion by employers.  The various forms  of collective reductions of working time 
surveyed at enterprise level are therefore closely linked to procedures to adapt and modulate 
working hours.  In other words, and in the words of D.  Taddei [  6], the problems surrounding 
working time during the last ten years have been characterised by "a simultaneous emphasis 
on the need to  link  a reduction with an adaptation of  working time".  In most negotiations, 
reduced  working time  seems to be  a counterpart for  adapted working hours  and  is  not  an 
objective in itself 
The impact of a reduction of working time on enterprise behaviour is  obviously linked to the 
circumstances that led enterprises to set in motion a modification of  working time. The author 
pinpoints two types of  circumstance that may act as triggers: 
)oo>  a  reduction  of the  collective  reference  standard  that  is  imposed  on  the  enterprise 
(constraint/external  shock)  because  of changes  to  working  time ·laid  down  by  law  or 
collective agreement; 
~  circumstances brought about by developments specific to the life of  the enterprise. 
In  the  case of reductions of the collective  standard of working time,  the author notes that 
during the period in question (1988-95) there was no  reduction of statutory working hours in 
any of the five  countries studied.  The first. type of trigger factor for a reduction of working 
time, where the obligation to reduce working time is imposed on enterprises through industry-
wide  collective  agreements,  concerned  only  Germany.  According  to  the  author  [6],  these 
agreements do not seem merely to have imposed additional constraints on German enterprises 
because  they  also  set  out  possibilities  for  more  flexible  internal  operation.  Analysis  of the 
implementation of  these industry-wide agreements at enterprise level shows, however, that few 
enterprises took up these possibilities of adapting working time,  since  less than  15%  of the 
enterprises in question made any change to working hours and less than 5% adapted working 
hours in order to improve capital use. 
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of enterprises,  the field  studies show that reductions of working time  are more often set  in 
motion by employers. In these circumstances, working time is usually reduced as a response to 
technological criteria or possibly changes in the economic environment of enterprises (changes 
in markets, the economic situation and competition). Changes in working hours in the first case 
are often connected with the introduction of new equipment and increases in  capital intensity 
that require, for reasons of profitability, increases in equipment use times.  These organisational 
changes often go together with a re-organisation of working time that in  most cases changes 
employees'  working  hours  for  the  worse.  In  such  cases,  reduced  working  time  is  then  a 
counterpart for the inconveniences connected with changes in production processes. 
As  stressed  by  D.  Taddei  [6],  the  effects  of reduced  working  time  on  the  economtc 
performance of enterprises  and  on  employment  come up  against  substantial  methodological 
problems.  In most cases it  is very difficult to isolate the impact of reduced working time  on 
employment from circumstances that can be attributed, for instance, to changes taking place in 
the economic environment such as changes in the economic situation, the introduction of new 
technologies, changes in production methods and work organisation, etc. 
While  the  results  of the  evaluation  studies  conducted  at  enterprise  level  on  the  impact  of 
reduced  working  time  on  employment  are  somewhat  contradictory,  the  field  surveys 
nevertheless tend to show that reduced working time has  in  some cases  made  it  possible to 
improve the employment situation either in  a defensive way by limiting redundancies or in  an 
offensive way by helping to create new jobs. In general, the impact of  reduced working time on 
employment  seems  to be  especially  positive if it  is  accompanied  by  changes  to  production 
structures that improve the use of  production equipment. 
The  monographs  also  confirm  that  ~ncreases in  employment  are  m  most  cases  less  than 
proportional to the reduction of  working time. This recurring finding can be explained both by 
the concomitant increase in production costs entailing a reduction of production capacity and 
production volume, especially when the reduction is not accompanied by a re-organisation, and 
by the substantial productivity gains generated by processes to adapt or reduce working time. 
In general, and all things being equal, the job sharing effect is proportional to the reduction of 
working  time  if the  growth  in  production  volume  is  greater  than  the  productivity  gains 
generated by  the reduction of working time  and by  any  re-organisation.  In other words,  the 
employment impact of a reduction of working time is highly dependent on the economic and 
competitive situation of  enterprises. In the case of  enterprises working in booming markets and 
when reduced working time makes it  possible,  as  a result of re-organisation, to improve the 
enterprise's competitive situation, reduced working time may increase production volume and 
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however, and the field surveys show that such a situation is rare. 
4.1.3  Reduction of working time, overtime and adjustment of employment. 
Variations of working hours, in particular by stepping up overtime or by laying personnel off, 
are the traditional methods by  which the volume of employment is  adjusted to variations in 
economic  activity.  These  adjustment  mechanisms  mean  that  enterprises  can  retain  skilled 
personnel during downturns of economic activity and  can very quickly make the most of an 
upturn in the economy and limit transaction costs connected with personnel turnover. This type 
of short-term adjustment is,  nevertheless, very expensive and a growing number of enterprises 
are introducing new forms of  managing working time (  annualisation, time banks, etc.) in order 
to curb the costs of overtime. Some enterprises may therefore see a reduction or adaptation of 
working time as an opportunity to reduce wage costs. In this respect, adapted working hours 
in  some  cases  involve  the  replacement  of financial  compensation  by  time-off in  lieu.  The 
introduction, for instance, of systems where working time is regulated on an annual basis may 
play  a  substantial  part  in  reducing  unit  production  costs,  improving  productivity  and 
production efficiency and adapting production levels in better ways to fluctuations in  demand. 
Changes  in  working  hours,  depending  on  work  in  hand,  are  often  disadvantageous  for 
employees  since  the  life  of households  outside work is  disturbed.  The  field  surveys  show 
therefore  that  working  time  tends  to  be  reduced  in  return  for  adapted  working  hours. 
Reconciling  the  sometimes  diverging  interests  of employers  and  employees  nevertheless 
requires  specific  methods of regulation  between the  social  partners.  While  the  institutional 
framework and economic and social regulation systems in some countries promote negotiated 
flexibility  (Germany,  the  Netherlands,· Sweden,  for  instance),  the  low  level  of trade  union 
representation in enterprises in other Member States (France, for instance) represents a major 
institutional obstacle to the success of  such negotiated compromises. 
As  noted in  the previous chapter,  some enterprises faced  with a reduction of working time 
may,  instead of recruiting new employees,  make more use of overtime, thereby reducing the 
potential effects of  reduced working time on employment. The rationale for such behaviour lies 
either in the fact that work force adjustments entail substantial costs (fixed costs, see below) or 
in the fact that there is a shortage of skilled labour. If a reduction of  working time is not to be 
accompanied by an increase in  overtime,  a prerequisite is that the proportion for which fixed 
costs  account  and  the  costs  of adjusting  the  labour  force  are  relatively  low.  These  costs 
naturally vary greatly depending on the type of activity and sector in question. In other words, 
and  all  things  being  equal,  it  is  to be  expected that the beneficial  effects  of job  sharing  on 
employment  differ  greatly  depending  on  types  of job  and  the  sectors  to which  enterprises 
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labour costs are relatively low and where less-skilled workers are in the majority. 
An  increase in  overtime during  a reduction of working time  may  also  be due to a mismatch 
between the labour supply and demand.  A shortage of skilled labour and low occupational and 
geographical  mobility  may,  during  a reduction of working time,  cause the  total  production 
volume to fall  and  may have a negative impact on growth and  employment and therefore on 
the level of  and trends in unemployment. In order to combat labour shortage problems, policies 
to adapt/reduce working time should, in the opinion of some authors ([2],  [7]  and [1 0]),  also 
be supplemented by an extension of active employment policy measures promoting both the 
geographical and occupational mobility of  the labour force. 
In order to prevent or limit the negative effects of increased overtime on the job sharing effect 
of reduced  working  time,  some  authors  suggest  either  a  limitation  of overtime  by  the 
authorities or the introduction of  new pay systems based on time off  in lieu rather than financial 
compensation  ([2],  [7]  [8]  and  [10]).  Acceptance  of these  changes  in  pay  structures  by 
employees or their representatives nevertheless depends to a large extent on the distribution of 
wages within the enterprises or sector in  question.  Limiting or abolishing paid overtime may 
therefore come up against a degree of  resistance from employees or their representatives. If  the 
distribution of wage incomes is  very dispersed and there is  a relatively high concentration of 
low wages, this may place a curb on the introduction of more flexible arrangements of  working 
hours and reductions of working time.  The British example provides a good illustration here 
(see, for instance, the remarkable study conducted by the Low Pay Research Trust [13]). For a 
large number of  British workers overtime is a structural element of  their pay.  For many British 
households, overtime tends very often to be a way of offsetting inadequate wages. A reduction 
of  overtime may lead to a substantial reduction of  household incomes in the case of an income 
distribution characterised by a high proportion of  low wages.  As the Low Pay Research Trust 
[ 13]  stresses, measures to promote less income dispersion and to raise low wages may prove 
to be more efficient in reducing or containing overtime than a reduction of working time or a 
statutory limitation of  overtime. 
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working time on employment 
The  question  of wage  compensation,  as  we  have  seen,  plays  a  key  part  in  the  impact  of 
reduced working time  on  trends  in  enterprises'  costs  and  on  the  effects  of a  reduction  of 
working time on employment.  In general,  wage compensation is  a complex problem and  has 
given  rise  to  a  polemical  and  lively  debate.  A  key  aspect  here  is  the  time  scale.  While 
reductions of  working time may be accompanied by negotiated compromises involving full  and 
immediate compensation, medium-term trends in wages may be lower than would have been 
the  case without this  reduction  of working time.  While  the  compensation  is  partial  from  a 
dynamic point of  view, it appears to be full from a static point of  view.  Some authors (see [2], 
for instance) therefore consider that collective reductions of working time must be  part and 
parcel of a long-term bargaining process (multi-annual collective agreements). Most collective 
reductions of working time (Germany,  the Netherlands) over the last ten years have usually 
been associated with some pay  restraint.  Unlike  a collective reduction by  a  statutory route, 
these  multi-annual  agreements  have  the  advantage  that  the  reduction  of working  time  is 
negotiated together with the issue of wage compensation. By allocating a proportion of future 
productivity gains to the reduction of working time  and  to wage  compensation,  negotiated 
agreements make it  possible  to  spread the  cost of reductions  of working time  over several 
years. 
The issue of wage compensation can  also  be fleshed  out from  an  analysis  of the  enterprise 
monographs (see [6]). In the case of an offensive reduction, accompanied by a re-organisation 
of  labour and production processes, wage compensation is in most cases full.  The productivity 
gains brought about by the reduction of working time  (fewer gaps  in  the working day  and 
more intensive work rates) and the extension of equipment use times make full  compensation 
possible and in some cases may even improve employees' purchasing power. In the case of a 
defensive reduction (safeguarding jobs), where sustaining staff numbers means that the wage 
bill  has to be reduced or kept at the same level,  there is  in  most cases zero or partial wage 
compensation. 
In  most  Member  States  of the  European  Union,  collective  bargaining  plays  a  key  part  in 
regulating the employer-employee relationship and working conditions. Pay, working time and 
the distribution of  working hours are all fields covered by collective bargaining. The behaviour 
of the social  actors  needs  to be  analysed  in  order to  find  out what  types  of trade-off are 
possible between pay, working time and employment levels.  The key issue is one of  finding out 
what  conditions  need  to  be  satisfied  for  the  outcome  of collective  bargaining  on  pay  and 
working time to have a favourable effect on employment and social well-being. In other words, 
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of  working time leads to a situation that promotes employment. In general, it may well be that 
compromises on levels of  wage compensation depend on the distribution of  income. The study 
conducted  by  the  Low  Pay  Research  Trust  [ 13]  provides  interesting  information  on  the 
relationships between income distribution, working hours and wage compensation.  This study 
shows,  on the  one  hand,  that  the  distribution  of working  time  is  not  independent  of the 
distribution of income and that,  on the other hand,  the  distribution of income may  have  an 
impact on the trade-off between working time and income growth which in turn does little for 
the job sharing effect of a reduction of working time.  In other words,  an income distribution 
which  is  very  dispersed  with  a  high  concentration of low  wages  may  place  a  curb  on the 
introduction  of negotiated  agreements  to  reduce  working  hours  that  promote  employment 
since,  as  noted  above,  wage compensation plays  a key  part  in  the  employment  effect  of a 
reduction of working time.  As the authors of the report stress, an authoritarian and collective 
reduction of working time without wage compensation in  Great Britain would  be  likely  to 
come up against opposition from a large proportion of  British employees and their trade union 
representatives precisely because of  the high concentration of  low wages. 
It is also interesting to note that most of  the collective reductions of  working time over the last 
ten years haye taken place in Germany and the Netherlands where the average income level is 
relatively low and income distribution is not very dispersed. In other words, choices of  reduced 
working time depend to a large extent on the distribution of income and  rates of economic 
growth.  The study conducted by Meulders and  Plasman [ 11]  convincingly demonstrates that 
the slowing down of reductions of working time in  the latter part of  this century coincides 
with the downturn in growth from the middle of the 1970s, a downturn which is undoubtedly 
not without an impact on the trade-off between free time and consumption in  sharing out the 
fruits of growth. In a period of recession and slacker economic growth, it is  doubtful whether 
the social  partners will  reach compromises on  reduced working time  accompanied by  wage 
compensation that  promote job sharing  and  therefore  that  one  of the  prerequisites  for  the 
efficiency of  policies to reduce working time, i.e.  pay restraint, will be met. 
4.1.5  Flexible working time: the European experience 
Over the last twenty to thirty years,  the globalisation of competition has profoundly changed 
production  methods  and  work  organisation  in  enterprises.  In  most  authors'  opinion,  a 
successful policy on working time must take into account the new needs of  enterprises in terms 
of  flexible production. Changes in consumer behaviour and the product diversification to which 
these changes have  led  have  meant that an  increasing  number of enterprises  have gradually 
abandoned Taylorist methods of mass production. The introduction of these new tp.ethods  of 
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traditional  ways  of adjusting  employment  (overtime,  variable  stock management)  and  by  a 
much more flexible organisation of work and working time.  This new paradigm for work and 
production organisation seems to be making the conventional weekly working time  standard 
obsolete for some enterprises and is  forcing them to rethink the ways in which they regulate 
working time. 
Changes in the structure and distribution of  working hours are only a subset, albeit important, 
of recent  changes  affecting  production  methods  and  work  organisation.  These  new  trends 
have,  as  noted  above,  generated  changes  in  pay  formation  methods  (monthly  pay  is  now 
widespread) and a convergence of the status of different groups of workers (white-collar and 
blue-collar).  There has been a marked shift  away from  the traditional methods of managing 
working hours (standardisation and concentration around a weekly norm,  the traditional way 
of monitoring  working  hours)  towards  more  diverse  and  individual  working  hours.  These 
changes in work organisation are also  being reflected by a decentralisation and delegation of 
responsibilities  and  decision-making  (increased  autonomy,  multiskilling,  team  work).  In  a 
growing  number  of enterprises,  strict  control  of working  hours  is  being  replaced  by 
performance monitoring. These changes often give employees much more freedom in choosing 
their  working  hours.  These  new  trends  therefore  reflect  the  transition  from  a  relatively 
comparable  structure of working  time  organisation  to  more  complex  and  more  diversified 
structures. The field  surveys show that these new and innovative forms of work organisation 
are not just limited to manufacturing industry but are also  spreading to other sectors such as 
the health care sector,  the retail trade,  banks,  etc.  These new ways of organising work and 
working  hours  are  coming  up,  however,  against  problems  connected  with  infrastructure 
(accessibility and flexibility of  institutional childminding methods, urban transport, etc.) and are 
also meeting a degree of  resistance from employees. 
The study conducted by the Cranfield Institute ([5]) analyses recent developments in contract 
and working time flexibility in Europe from a survey conducted among a sample of European 
enterprises. 
Despite different methods of institutional  regulation,  the  survey findings  show that  contract 
and working time flexibility is clearly on the increase in Europe. It is not just the range of  ways 
in  which  working  hours  are  being  adapted  but  also  the  proportion of enterprises  that  are 
introducing  these  changes  and  the  number  of employees  concerned  that  are  increasing 
throughout the European Community.  Levels  and  growth rates  obviously  differ  in  different 
Member States, but the general trend is undoubtedly towards an increase in and diversification 
of flexible  working time methods.  These national differences in  the use of different forms  of 
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social  regulation methods,  legal  and  institutional framework,  national traditions of industrial 
relations).  The findings of the survey seem to show that the national context is  more crucial 
here  than  differences  in  size  or  even  in  the  sectors to  which  enterprises  belong.  With  the 
exception of Great Britain and  Sweden,  overtime is  tending to decline  while  other forms  of 
flexible  working  time  (part-time  and  shift  work,  weekend  work,  annualisation)  are  on  the 
increase in  all the countries studied.  Little progress seems,  however, to have been made with 
some forms of  work such as homeworking and teleworking. 
This  marked trend towards the diversification of flexible  forms  of working time  means  that 
enterprises can now make a broader range of choices in order to adapt their work force needs 
to market requirements. From the point of view of employees, while it is true that diversified 
forms of  flexible working hours give them greater freedom of choice, it should also be borne in 
mind that the development of  some forms of  working time seems to be exacerbating the duality 
between different labour market segments and worsening gender segregation. Flexible working 
time is often associated with lower pay levels and with less stable employment relationships. In 
parallel  with  the upturn  in  flexible  forms  of working time,  there has  also  been an  increase, 
whose level varies in different Member States, in fixed-term employment contracts. The survey 
findings would therefore seem to show that the diversification of working time is  also  being 
reflected by more flexible employment contracts and more precarious employment. 
Analysis of the survey findings  does not seem to confirm that there is  a simple and  clear-cut 
relationship  between  the  growth  of flexible  forms  of work  organisation  and  levels  of 
employment. Greater flexibility is an issue for enterprises increasing their staff numbers as well 
as for enterprises reducing them. 
4.1 .6  Comments 
An  approach based on micro-economics and  monographs is  clearly of interest as it  makes it 
possible to pinpoint a certain number of  circumstantial factors that shape the job sharing effect 
of a reduction of working time.  These studies show in particular the important part played by 
methods of  implementing reductions of  working hours and by bargaining and the behaviour of 
economic  operators.  The  micro-economic approach  confirms,  moreover,  the  important  part 
that  re-organisations  of production  methods  and  adaptations  of working  hours  play  in  the 
impact  of reductions  of working  time  on  employment.  The  studies  analysed  in  this  report 
distance themselves from a debate which too often bears the stamp of fixed ideological views. 
Based on interesting case studies,  the authors of the various reports put forward  convincing 
arguments about the conditions that need to be satisfied if a policy to reduce or adapt working 
50 time  is  to have  a positive effect  on employment and  to make  enterprises more competitive. 
While the field  surveys show that reduced working time agreements concluded at enterprise 
level  may  prove  effective  in  maintaining  or increasing  employment  and  making  enterprises 
more competitive, it is questionable whether these favourable cases can be transferred to other 
enterprises, sectors or even other Member States, whose institutional arrangements mean that 
negotiated compromises are harder to achieve. The representativeness of the enterprise sample 
selected should encourage readers to guard against any temptation to generalise the sometimes 
beneficial effects on employment,  of  the reductions of  working time studied,  to the economy 
as a whole. 
In  general,  traditional  micro-economic  optimisation  models  (comparative  statistical  studies) 
show that a reduction of working time may,  in certain circumstances, have positive effects on 
employment. Repercussions on the volume of  personnel depend to a large extent on the size of 
adjustment  costs  (fixed  costs)  and  the  degree  of comparability  of the  labour  force,  the 
possibilities of substitution between men  and  working  hours  and  between capital  and  work 
force, the impact of  the reduction of working time on equipment use times and lastly on levels 
of wage compensation. These studies rightly show that while there may in theory be positive 
effects on employment, the job sharing effect is based on very restrictive conditions which have 
little chance ofbeing satisfied at the sectoral or macro-economic level. 
The various studies analysed in this first section confirm that in  order to promote employment 
reduced  working  time  must  be  seen  as  part  and  parcel  of a  broader  context  covering 
production and work organisation.  Changes in  working hours seem in  effect to be one of a 
number of  factors in the overall restructuring of  production methods and work organisation. 
The transition from  Taylorist methods of work organisation and  management of production 
methods  to post-Fordist methods  is  paving  the way  for  the  introduction of innovative  and 
diversified systems of managing working time.  It should be noted,  however,  that adaptations 
and modulations of  working hours are not enough on their own to reduce working time. While 
some changes in work organisation may give rise to compromises leading in some cases to an 
actual  reduction of working time  (in  return for the drawbacks of more flexible  and  variable 
working hours), the field  surveys also show that adapting working hours does not necessarily 
lead to a reduction of working time.  In other words, while changes in production organisation 
in most cases involve a re-organisation of  hierarchical structures (delegation of  responsibilities, 
greater  autonomy),  internal  mobility  and  increased  multiskilling,  the  removal  of the  link 
between the  equipment  use  times  and  working  hours,  task rationalisation  and  therefore  an 
overall improvement of the competitive position of enterprises, the trade-off between income 
growth and  free  time  may  vary from  one  enterprise  or sector to another.  Even in  the  case 
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time has positive effects on employment. 
Factors of an institutional and political type may also limit the efficiency of collective policies 
to  reduce  working  time.  The  efficiency  of such  policies  is  closely  linked  to the  nature  of 
industrial  relations  and  relationships  between  the  various  social  partners  (government, 
employers and trade unions).  It may  well  be that countries with centralised and  coordinated· 
bargaining systems and high levels of trade union representation within enterprises 'have more 
of a  chance  of reaching  negotiated  agreements  to  reduce  working  time  likely  to  promote 
employment.  While  a  high  level  of coordination  and  articulation  of the  various  bargaining 
levels would seem, however, to be necessary, it is not enough on its own to ensure the success 
of a policy  to  reduce  working time  ..  Consequently,  in  addition  to  the  evident  problems  of 
coordination between the various levels of social concertation (both national  and  European), 
the emergence of compromises promoting employment is  strongly conditioned by  operators' 
practices and the objectives that they support. It is far from evident that a collective reduction 
of working time will generate a convergence of interests that leads to increased employment. 
The balances to which negotiated reductions of working time lead may also  prove to be less 
than  Qptimum  as  regards  employment.  While  it  is  generally  accepted  that  a  reduction  of 
working time improves the well-being of employees (insiders), it has yet to be proven that the 
methods by  which this  reduction of working time  is  implemented,  in  particular the level  of 
wage compensation,  do  anything  for jobseekers (outsiders).  Most supporters of job sharing 
often neglect these conflicts of interest and  implicitly assume a solidarity between "insiders" 
and  "outsiders",  an  assumption which  seems to be very  restrictive when viewed  against the 
growth and permanent nature of  mass unemployment. Uncertainties about the behaviour of  the 
social actors in relation to wage compensation levels give rise to uncertain results in terms of 
employment It is  therefore crucial to take account of the conflicting objectives of the social 
actors and to look carefully at the circumstances that may pave the way for compromises that 
promote  employment.  Recent  theoretical  developments  (see  Autun  and  Cahuc  1998  and 
Grenier 1998) regarding bargaining models shed an interesting light on the uncertain impact of 
a reduction of  working time on employment. These models show, in particular, that inadequate 
representation of the interests of the unemployed (outsiders)  in  collective bargaining and  the 
structure of the preferences of people with jobs (insiders)  as  regards the trade-off between 
income and free time both run counter to job sharing. 
While  a  policy  promoting  a  negotiated  and  decentralised  reduction  of working  time  at 
enterprise or establishment level makes it possible to take account of  the constraints specific to 
enterprises  and  to  ensure  that the  reduction  of working  time  is  more  in  keeping  with  the 
enterprise's  actual  situation  (principle  of  subsidiarity),  its  potential  overall  effect  on 
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there  is  no  broad social consensus and labour  market mechanisms making it possible  to 
introduce  these  changes have  not been  set up,  it is  unlikely  that coordinated measures  to 
introduce a reduced full-time working week will be  taken spontaneously or by de centralised 
adjustments".  Collective reductions of working time  by  the  authorities  come  up,  however, 
against major organisational problems and presuppose that enterprises are very adaptable and 
that labour market adjustment mechanisms actually exist when in fact they may not. 
4.2  Policies to reduce wage costs and reduce working time 
As stressed above, theoretical collective bargaining models show that negotiated reductions of 
working time do not lead spontaneously to compromises likely to promote employment.  The 
impact of  financial incentives to reduce working time therefore need to be examined. In recent 
years,  public ,financial  incentive  schemes  combining a  reduction of compulsory levies  and  a 
reduction  of working  time  have  been  proposed  and  implemented  in  some  Member  States 
(France and Belgium).  These public incentives to reduce working time have taken the form 
largely of partial exemptions from employers' social security charges. The promoters of these 
schemes feel that they not only have the advantage that they trigger reductions of  working time 
but also that they reduce enterprises' production costs and therefore consolidate the effect of 
changes in working hours on employment Gob sharing effect and competitiveness effect). Two 
studies commissioned by the European Commission [7]  &  [9]  examine the impact of changes 
to the structure of compulsory levies,  and in  particular the impact of a modulation of social 
security contributions as a function of working time on employment and unemployment.  The 
first  study  [7]  advocates an  offensive policy of job sharing  and  recommends a  reduction of 
employers' charges to promote a reduction of working time.  The second study [9], conducted 
by the IFO Institute, and based on partially balanced micro-economic models (labour demand 
model), analyses, on the one hand, the effect of  compulsory levies and fixed labour costs on the 
distribution of employment and working hours within enterprises and,  on the other hand,  the 
potential impact of a reduction/mod\dation of compulsory levies  on enterprises'  recruitment 
practices. 
4.2.1  Fixed labour costs and reductions of working time 
In general, the effect of an increase in fixed labour costs (varying with personnel numbers and 
irrespective of working time) is to increase the marginal cost of employment while leaving the 
marginal cost of  working hours unchanged. As stressed in the first chapter of  this report, in the 
case of substantial indirect wage costs, an enterprise faced with a reduction of working time, 
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advantageous  to  increase  its  employees'  working  time  than  to  recruit  new  employees.  All 
things being equal, moreover, the effect of an increase in fixed  labour costs is to increase the 
working time that enterprises need to offset them and to generate a substitution of men  for 
working hours that does little to promote employment. 
The hypothesis of a link between working time,  skill levels and fixed  costs seems to be borne 
out by the fact that short part-time work is  concentrated in  sectors in  which low-skilled jobs 
are  in  the  majority  and  where  there  is  considerable  personnel  turnover.  By  analogy  with 
equipment use times which, in the case of  enterprises that are very capital intensive, have to be 
long, levels of investment in human capital must also be correlated with working time.  It may 
therefore be the case that that the higher the skills required for the job, the more advantageous 
it will be for the enterprise to make extensive use of  the work force. 
4.2.2  Impact of compulsory levies on the distribution of working time 
There are two types of  system for employers' social security charges. The first type is generally 
one  in  which there is  a constant hourly rate of social  security  contributions,  the amount  of 
contributions paid by the employer being proportional to the enterprise's wage bill.  The second 
type,  as well as levying social security contributions at a constant rate, introduces a gradation 
of  social security charges after a certain pay ceiling. In this second type of system, the amount 
of  social security charges paid by the employer increases with pay up to a certain ceiling and is 
fixed for employees whose pay exceeds this ceiling.  In other words, the system of compulsory 
levies becomes regressive from  a certain level  of pay.  An increase in  the working hours of 
employees whose pay exceeds the ceiling does not have any  impact on the amount of levies 
paid by the employer. Above the ceiling, the amount of social security contributions paid may 
therefore be seen as a fixed cost irrespective of working time and levels of pay.  The marginal 
cost of  an hour of  overtime is therefore, in terms of compulsory levies, zero. Below the ceiling, 
compulsory levies may, in contrast, be seen as a variable cost. 
From  the  point  of view  of the  relationship  between  working  time  and  the  structure  of 
compulsory levies, systems where there is a ceiling on employers' social security contributions 
tend  to  promote the  recruitment  of skilled  personnel  and  to  encourage  enterprises  to  use 
overtime when payment for this overtime is over and above the ceiling.  As Euzeby and Euzeby 
[7] note, the existence of  a ceiling on social security contributions may also have an impact on 
entrepreneurs'  choices  between,  for  instance,  full-time  and  part-time  work.  The  lower the 
ceiling, the higher the additional costs that an enterprise has to bear when it creates part-time 
jobs.  This  discourages  the  development  of this  kind  of job.  Inversely,  as  a  result  of the 
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the enterprise. 
4.2.3  The  impact of a modification of the  rates  and  structure of compulsory  levies 
on working time and employment 
» Reduction of  the hourly rate of  social security contributions 
The effect of a general reduction of the hourly rates of social security contributions under the 
first type of  scheme is to reduce enterprises' wage costs and generally to promote employment. 
As the relative costs of the various categories of employee remain unchanged,  a reduction of 
employers' charges should not in this case generate a substitution between different categories 
of  employee. 
In the case of a system of compulsory levies with a ceiling on  social security contributions, a 
reduction  of the  hourly  rate  of social  security  charges  also  promotes  employment.  For 
employees above the ceiling, a reduction of  the hourly rate of employers' charges in particular 
entails a reduction of the proportion of fixed  costs in  the total and  should therefore tend to 
reduce working hours and promote employment. 
The  overall  effect  on  employment  of a  reduction  of employers'  charges  is  not,  however, 
independent from the way this reduction is financed.  The positive effects described above on 
the labour demand from enterprises implicitly presuppose budget neutrality. If the reduction of 
employers' charges is not fully financed and involves an increase in the other compulsory levies 
(VAT,  income tax,  etc.), the spin-off effect of the increase in  these other compulsory levies 
should  be  taken  into  account  when  evaluating  the  net  effects  on  employment  and 
unemployment  of a  reduction  of social  security  contributions.  The  spin-off  effects  on 
household consumption and  labour supply need  in  particular to be  studied in  greater depth. 
Some studies (see Steiner,  1996) listed in the study by the IFO institute [9]  show that the net 
effect  on employment in both the short and  the long term of a reduction of social  security 
contributions not accompanied by  an  increase in  the tax burden are positive.  In contrast, the 
same  study  shows that while  the  short-term effect  on  employment  of a reduction  of social 
security charges financed  by  an  increase in  VAT  remains positive,  the long-term effects  are 
negligible or even negative. 
55 ).  Changes to the ceiling on social security contributions 
In the case of schemes with a ceiling on social security contributions, the effect of an increase 
in the threshold of social security contributions is to increase enterprises' wage costs but also 
to increase the proportion of overall production costs for which fixed labour costs account. In 
theory and in the likely case in which the pay of less-skilled employees is generally below the 
ceiling, raising the ceiling increases fixed labour costs for employees above the ceiling. Raising 
the threshold  consequently modifies  the  relative  costs of skilled  and  unskilled  personnel  in 
favour of  the latter. Depending on the degree to which these two work force categories can be 
substituted,  raising the ceiling on  social  security contributions should  promote the increased 
employment of less-skilled workers. This reasoning is valid, however, only for a given level of 
production. An increase in wage costs may,  on the one hand,  encourage the enterprise to step 
up  its  capital intensity (capital  and  labour substitution) and,  on the other hand,  may  have  a 
negative impact on the volume of production because of the increase in unit production costs 
(loss of  market). The new equilibrium of enterprises is therefore likely to be reflected by are-
allocation of  employment to less-skilled workers and by a personnel volume that is smaller than 
in the situation prevailing prior to the change in the structure of  compulsory levies. 
In  the  extreme  case,  removing  the  ceiling  from  social  security  contributions  should,  by 
reducing the proportion of production costs for  which fixed  costs account,  all  other things 
remaining  equal,  have  an  impact  on  the  distribution  of working  hours  in  which  the  hours 
worked by employees previously situated above the ceiling tend to be reduced.  An increase in 
unit labour costs would tend,  however, to have a negative impact on production volume and 
therefore  on the level  of employment.  Removing  the  ceiling  also  brings  about a  change  in 
relative  costs  in  favour  of less-skilled jobs,  as  the  increase  in  the hourly  cost  of labour of 
better-skilled  employees  leads  to  a  substitution  in  favour  of the  less-skilled.  As  above,  the 
effect  on  the  employment  of the  less-skilled  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  hypotheses 
concerning the degree of  substitution between different labour categories. If, as some empirical 
studies  have  attempted  to  show,  the  various  personnel  categories  are  complementary  (in 
particular supervisory staff and other groups of employees),  an increase in the wage costs of 
skilled jobs  may  bring  about  a  concomitant  reduction  of numbers  of skilled  and  unskilled 
workers. 
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Faced with the conflicting results of  general and top-down policies to reduce working time on 
employment and unemployment,  some Member States have introduced tax incentive schemes 
to  encourage  enterprises  to  reduce  their  working  hours  and  to  increase  their  personnel 
numbers.  There are two such types of system.  Under the first  scheme, enterprises introducing 
measures  to  reduce  working  time  receive  subsidies.  Criteria  of recruitment  or  sustained 
employment generally have to be met to obtain these subsidies. This type of  public aid has been 
introduced in France (Robien Law) and in Belgium (Global Plan).  Under the second type of 
scheme,  the  hourly  rates  of social  security  contributions  are  modulated  as  a  function  of 
working time (Rocard proposal); a scheme of  this type has yet to be applied.  A modulation of 
the  hourly  rates  of social  security  contributions  means  that  all  the  hours  worked  below  a 
certain threshold are subject to a subsidy proportional to the hourly wage and a levy that is also 
proportional to the hourly wage above this threshold. 
Attempts to evaluate the efficiency of  the first type of public scheme show, however, that only 
a minority of enterprises has responded to this incentive  [see  [6]).  This type of scheme,  like 
policies to reduce wage costs (wage subsidy),  is  also  very  often associated  with  substantial 
windfall  effects 
11  that detract  substantially  from  the  efficiency  of these  financial  incentives. 
While  the  effects  of reductions  of employers'  charges  on  the  propensity  of enterprises  to 
launch  collective measures to reduce working time  are  not comparable,  it  would  seem that 
such  schemes  have been more  successful in  developing  certain individual  forms  of reduced 
working time, and in particular part-time work. 
The IFO  Institute  [9]  has  attempted to estimate the expected effects on employment of the 
application of the Robien Law in  Germany.  The  aim  of the Robien Law was to encourage 
negotiated  agreements  on  reductions of working time  at  enterprise  level  likely  to  promote 
employment (creation or safeguarding of  jobs). Under this scheme,  employers'  social security 
contributions are reduced by 3  0% (  40%) over six years in the case of a reduction of working 
time of 10 to 15% if the enterprise undertakes to increase staff numbers by  10% (15%).  This 
reduction of social  security charges would lead  in  Germany to a reduction of social  security 
contributions  by  5. 6  points.  Bearing  in  mind  a  long-term  elasticity  of labour  demand  of 
approximately 0.5%,  the introduction of a  scheme  of this type in  Germany  (where  50%  of 
contributions  are  paid  by  employees  and  50%  by  employers,  and  where  there  is  a  ceiling) 
would increase employment by approximately I%. Evaluation of  the impact of  the Robien Law 
11  The windfall  effect  measures  the  proportion  of enterprises  that would  have  changed  their  recruitment 
practices even if  the scheme had not existed. 
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Germany should not be over-estimated. 
The second scheme,  advocated in  1996 by the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
of the European Parliament (Rocard proposal), involves a modulation of the hourly rates of 
social  security  contributions  as  a  function  of working  time.  The  modulation  involves  an 
increase  in  the  hourly  rate  of social  security  contributions  for  working  hours  above  a 
predetermined threshold (3 2 hours) and a reduction of  these rates for working hours below this 
threshold. In financial terms, compulsory levies are reduced by 1 ECU per hour for the first 3  2 
working hours and increased by 4 ECU per hour above the 32-hour threshold.  In the case of 
enterprises  maintaining  a  40-hour  working  week,  the  overall  total  of  social  security 
contributions paid by the enterprise does not change.  One of the advantages of  ·the  scheme is 
therefore that it does not increase the compulsory levies paid by enterprises that do not change 
their working  hours.  Another  advantage  is  that enterprises  introducing  measures to  reduce 
working  time  can  reduce  their  production  costs  and  finance  a  certain  degree  of wage 
compensation.  Unlike  the previous  scheme,  this  modulation  of the  structure of compulsory 
levies  creates an  increasing  relationship  between working time  and  average  hourly  rates  of 
social  security  contributions  and  therefore  between  working  time  and  unit  labour  costs. 
Depending on the rates of graduation of social  security contributions and  assuming that the 
average hours of  the less-skilled labour force are shorter than those of  the skilled labour force, 
the reduction of compulsory levies means that enterprises reducing their working time benefit 
from a decrease in the relative  wag~ costs of less-skilled emplqyees.  In theory, it is therefore 
possible to encourage enterprises to reduce working time in a way that promotes employment, 
at  least  for  less-skilled  employees.  A scheme of this  type,  assuming that it  does manage to 
change enterprises'  recruitment practices,  nevertheless has  a budget cost that should not be 
disregarded. 
The IFO Institute [9]  attempts to estimate the impact of the Rocard proposal on employment 
from  German data (industrial workers).  The application of a scheme of this type in  Germany 
would tend to increase the hourly cost of labour of workers working over 32 hours by some 
1.5%.  The reduction of social  security contributions for workers working less than 32 hours 
would reduce the hourly cost of  labour by some 12%. Assuming that workers working over 32 
hours are more skilled than those working below the 32-hour threshold and  bearing in  mind 
that the labour demand is more sensitive to a variation in the hourly wage of this latter group, 
the IFO study shows that the employment of skilled workers would fall by some 12 000 while 
the  employment  of less-skilled  workers  would  rise  by  some · 13 8  000.  In  the  light  of the 
estimates obtained,  modulating  social  security  contributions as  a function  of working  hours 
would promote a re-allocation of the skilled labour force towards a less-skilled labour force 
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report stress, these estimates should, however, be revised downwards. The results obtained in 
terms  of employment  depend  to  a  large  extent  on  hypotheses  on  the  elasticity  of labour 
demand  with respect to the hourly wage adopted for  the  different  labour categories.  These 
estimates are also based on the very strong hypothesis of complete substitution between the 
two types of work force.  These estimates lastly concern only labour demand and do not take 
account of any changes in the structure of compulsory levies on the labour supply in  order to 
ensure  budget  neutrality.  In  other  words,  as  the  authors  stress,  the  estimated  effects 
presuppose  a  high  degree  of elasticity  of the  labour  supply which  is  not  borne  out by  the 
empirical studies conducted in this field. 
4.2.5  Comments 
In order to pinpoint the effects on employment of a combined scheme to reduce social security 
contributions and  to reduce working time,  it  is  necessary  to  describe  a  reference  situation, 
which cannot by definition be observed, which shows what direction employment would have 
taken if the  scheme had not been implemented.  The literature on employment  subsidies  has 
clearly  identified  a  range  of side  effects  that  reduce  the  efficiency  of this  type  of system. 
Among  these  effects,  windfall  or dead-weight,  displacement,  cannibalism  and  substitution 
effects, to cite only a few,  have been examined in detail and in some cases have proved to be 
very substantial (see Anxo 1995 and Gazier 1994), greatly limiting the efficiency of  this type of 
scheme  in  terms  of net  job  creation.  In  general,  this  type  of subsidy  distorts  competition 
between enterprises.  Looking here only at a modulation of social  security contributions as  a 
function of  working hours, enterprises with a working time of less than 40 hours may improve 
their  competitive position to the  detriment  of enterprises  that  do  not reduce their working 
time
12
.  These  windfall  effects  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  trends  in  employment  in 
enterprises not eligible for the award of  the subsidy. 
Even in the favourable case where the scheme encourages enterprises to modify their working 
hours, it remains to be shown that this reduction of working time has a substantial impact on 
personnel volume. The reservations that we put forward concerning the job sharing effects of  a 
reduction of working time also apply to this type of scheme.  In any case, it may well be true 
that the impact of a reduction of  working hours on recruitment is at best less than proportional 
to the reduction of  working time.  As noted above, moreover, if  the reduction of  working time 
is  to be  efficient  it  should  not be accompanied  by  a  reduction  of capital  use  times.  A re-
organisation of the production process  entails  substantial  costs and  it  remains  to be  shown 
12  In particular enterprises having a substantial proportion of  part  -time employees. 
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of production methods and a wage compensation which,  as noted above, plays a large part in 
making a reduction of  working time acceptable to employees. Like other tax incentive schemes 
(such as the Robien Law), a modulation of employers' contributions as a function of working 
time may have an impact on the timescale of  processes of  re-organisation, by speeding up these 
processes in enterprises that have planned them.  Bearing in mind the relatively modest results 
of this  type  of scheme,  the  Rocard  proposal  may  well  have  little  effect  on  enterprises' 
recruitment practices and the efficiency of this type of scheme may be limited by substantial 
windfall effects. 
The Rocard proposal also  comes up  against the problem of the heterogenous nature of the 
labour force and therefore the degree to which the various labour categories (skilled/unskilled, 
supervisory staff) can be substituted for one another. While, for instance, as some econometric 
studies have tended to show, supervisory staff and less-skilled employees are complementary, 
an  increase  in  the  wage  costs  of managers  would  also  reduce  the  number  of less-skilled 
personnel employed. 
Another limit on the modulation of social security contributions as a function of  working time 
is  linked to methods of control by the public authorities. It can be assumed that this type of 
scheme gives rise to collusion between employers and  employees involving manipulations of 
the  threshold  which  are  difficult  for  the  public  authorities  to  control.  There  is  nothing  to 
prevent employers from reducing their stated working time and failing  to notify hours above 
the 3  2-hour threshold, and remunerating employees working below the threshold by perks not 
directly linked to their actual working time (benefits in kind, fringe benefits, etc.). 
In theory, tax incentive measures to reduce working time may,  under certain conditions
13
,  be 
efficient in combating unemployment, especially of  the less-skilled, provided that they generate 
an increasing relationship between working time and the average hourly rate of social security 
contributions (see, for instance, P. Granier (1998)). 
This type of public action to promote job sharing policies should nevertheless be interpreted 
with  care  if it  is  not  accompanied  by  an  evaluation  of their  impact  on  public  finances.  An 
evaluation  of this  impact  in  particular  requires  an  analysis  of the  consequences  of such 
measures on overall unemployment and not solely on less-skilled employees. 
13  In particular, sustained equipment use times and the existence of spin-off productivity gains linked to  the 
reduction of  working time. 
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reduce working time and, on the other hand, lead to negotiated compromises likely to promote 
employment  and  reduce  unemployment,  the  tax  surpluses  (tax  supplements)  generated  by 
additional  recruitment may  prove to be less than the public  expenditure channelled into  the 
reduction of social security contributions. It may well be, therefore, that such schemes modify 
the structure of  compulsory levies with an increase in other types of  taxation (or alternatively a 
reduction  of public  expenditure  with  no  change  to  the  tax  burden).  It therefore  appears 
paramount,  in  order to evaluate  the  net  effects  on  employment  of a  modulation  of social 
security contributions, to analyse the impact of modifications of the structure of compulsory 
levies on wage formation methods (wage trends),  the labour supply,  household consumption 
and  the  potential  substitution  effects  linked  to  an  increase  in  the  tax  burden  on  growth, 
employment and unemployment. 
AsP. Granier (1998) rightly stresses: "it would not in any case be possible to be satisfied by 
an argument putting  forward the view that the financing of  the scheme could be expected  from 
the potential reduction of  unemployment, an argument which,  moreover, does not obviate the 
need  for a comparison with alternative policies of  identical budget cosf'. 
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